Reputations In Repeated Games
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Repeated Games And Reputations
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Author : George J. Mailath
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2006-09-28
Repeated Games And Reputations written by George J. Mailath and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006-09-28 with Business & Economics categories.
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Reputations In Repeated Games
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Author : George J. Mailath
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Reputations In Repeated Games written by George J. Mailath and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.
Reputations In Repeated Games Second Version
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Author : George J. Mailath
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Reputations In Repeated Games Second Version written by George J. Mailath and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.
Repeated Games And Reputations
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Author : George Joseph Mailath
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Repeated Games And Reputations written by George Joseph Mailath and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Economics, Mathematical categories.
Provides a complete treatment of the theory of repeated games and reputations, beginning with the elementary concepts required to work with repeated games and continuing to research frontier. This book is for those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Essays On Reputation And Repeated Games
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Author : Benjamin Leonard Sperisen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays On Reputation And Repeated Games written by Benjamin Leonard Sperisen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three essays on reputation and repeated games. Reputation models typically assume players have full memory of past events, yet in many applications this assumption does not hold. In the first chapter, I explore two different relaxations of the assumption that history is perfectly observed in the context of Ely and Välimäki's (2003) mechanic game, where reputation (with full history observation) is clearly bad for all players. First I consider "limited history," where short-run players see only the most recent T periods. For large T, the full history equilibrium behavior always holds due to an "echo" effect (for high discount factors); for small T, the repeated static equilibrium exists. Second I consider "fading history," where short-run players randomly sample past periods with probabilities that "fade" toward zero for older periods. When fading is faster than a fairly lax threshold, the long-run player always acts myopically, a result that holds more generally for reputation games where the long-run player has a strictly dominant stage game action. This finding suggests that reputational incentives may be too weak to affect long-run player behavior in some realistic word-of-mouth environments. The second chapter develops general theoretical tools to study incomplete information games where players observe only finitely many recent periods. I derive a recursive characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs, which allows analysis of both stationary and (previously unexplored) non-stationary equilibria. I also introduce "quasi-Markov perfection," an equilibrium refinement which is a necessary condition of any equilibrium that is "non-fragile" (purifiable), i.e., robust to small, additively separable and independent perturbations of payoffs. These tools are applied to two examples. The first is a product choice game with 1-period memory of the firm's actions, obtaining a complete characterization of the exact minimum and maximum purifiable equilibrium payoffs for almost all discount factors and prior beliefs on an "honest" Stackelberg commitment type, which shows that non-stationary equilibria expand the equilibrium set. The second is the same game with long memory: in all stationary and purifiable equilibria, the long-run player obtains exactly the Stackelberg payoff so long as the memory is longer than a threshold dependent on the prior. These results show that the presence of the honest type (even for arbitrarily small prior beliefs) qualitatively changes the equilibrium set for any fixed discount factor above a threshold independent of the prior, thereby not requiring extreme patience. The third chapter studies the question of why drug trafficking organizations inflict violence on each other, and why conflict breaks out under some government crackdowns and not others, in a repeated games context. Violence between Mexican drug cartels soared following the government's anti-cartel offensive starting in 2006, but not under previous crackdowns. I construct a theoretical explanation for these observations and previous empirical research. I develop a duopoly model where the firms have the capacity to make costly attacks on each other. The firms use the threat of violence to incentivize inter-cartel cooperation, and under imperfect monitoring, violence occurs on the equilibrium path of a high payoff equilibrium. When a "corrupt" government uses the threat of law enforcement as a punishment for uncooperative behavior, violence is not needed as frequently to achieve high payoffs. When government cracks down indiscriminately, the firms may return to frequent violence as a way of ensuring cooperation and high payoffs, even if the crackdown makes drug trafficking otherwise less profitable.
Multiple Reputations In Finitely Repeated Games
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Author : Shaun Hargreaves-Heap
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1989
Multiple Reputations In Finitely Repeated Games written by Shaun Hargreaves-Heap and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1989 with Economics categories.
Reputation And Punishment In Repeated Games With Two Long Run Players
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Author : Robert A. Evans
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1995
Reputation And Punishment In Repeated Games With Two Long Run Players written by Robert A. Evans and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1995 with Equilibrium (Economics) categories.
Reputation And Commitment In Two Person Repeated Games
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Author : Martin Cripps
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1992
Reputation And Commitment In Two Person Repeated Games written by Martin Cripps and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1992 with Game theory categories.
Reputation And Bounded Memory In Repeated Games With Incomplete Information
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Author : Daniel Monte
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Reputation And Bounded Memory In Repeated Games With Incomplete Information written by Daniel Monte and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
A Long Run Collaboration On Long Run Games
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Author : Drew Fudenberg
language : en
Publisher: World Scientific
Release Date : 2009
A Long Run Collaboration On Long Run Games written by Drew Fudenberg and has been published by World Scientific this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with Mathematics categories.
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.