Reputation And Commitment In Two Person Repeated Games

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Reputation And Commitment In Two Person Repeated Games

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Author : Martin Cripps
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1992

Reputation And Commitment In Two Person Repeated Games written by Martin Cripps and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1992 with Game theory categories.

Reputation And Commitment In Two Person Repeated Games Without Discounting

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Author : M. W. Cripps
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993

Reputation And Commitment In Two Person Repeated Games Without Discounting written by M. W. Cripps and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with categories.

Repeated Games And Reputations

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Author : George J. Mailath
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2006-09-28

Repeated Games And Reputations written by George J. Mailath and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006-09-28 with Business & Economics categories.

Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.

Game Theory And Economic Analysis

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Author : Christian Schmidt
language : en
Publisher: Routledge
Release Date : 2002-06-20

Game Theory And Economic Analysis written by Christian Schmidt and has been published by Routledge this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002-06-20 with Business & Economics categories.

This book presents the huge variety of current contributions of game theory to economics. The reader is taken through a concise history of game theory and exposed to original pieces of work that are significant to game theory as a whole.

Reputation With Long Run Players And Imperfect Observation

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Author : Alp E. Atakan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009

Reputation With Long Run Players And Imperfect Observation written by Alp E. Atakan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.

Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players with equal discount factors. We restrict attention to an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous move stage game where actions of player 2 are imperfectly observed. The set of commitment types for player 1 is taken as any (countable) set of finite automata. In this context, for a restricted class of stage games, we provide a one sided reputation result. If player 1 is a particular commitment type with positive probability and player 2's actions are imperfectly observed, then player 1 receives his highest pay-off, compatible with individual rationality, in any Bayes-Nash equilibria, as agents become patient. -- Repeated Games ; Reputation ; Equal Discount Factor ; Long-run Players ; Imperfect Observation ; Complicated Types ; Finite Automaton

Essays On Reputation And Repeated Games

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Author : Benjamin Leonard Sperisen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015

Essays On Reputation And Repeated Games written by Benjamin Leonard Sperisen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.

This dissertation consists of three essays on reputation and repeated games. Reputation models typically assume players have full memory of past events, yet in many applications this assumption does not hold. In the first chapter, I explore two different relaxations of the assumption that history is perfectly observed in the context of Ely and Välimäki's (2003) mechanic game, where reputation (with full history observation) is clearly bad for all players. First I consider "limited history," where short-run players see only the most recent T periods. For large T, the full history equilibrium behavior always holds due to an "echo" effect (for high discount factors); for small T, the repeated static equilibrium exists. Second I consider "fading history," where short-run players randomly sample past periods with probabilities that "fade" toward zero for older periods. When fading is faster than a fairly lax threshold, the long-run player always acts myopically, a result that holds more generally for reputation games where the long-run player has a strictly dominant stage game action. This finding suggests that reputational incentives may be too weak to affect long-run player behavior in some realistic word-of-mouth environments. The second chapter develops general theoretical tools to study incomplete information games where players observe only finitely many recent periods. I derive a recursive characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs, which allows analysis of both stationary and (previously unexplored) non-stationary equilibria. I also introduce "quasi-Markov perfection," an equilibrium refinement which is a necessary condition of any equilibrium that is "non-fragile" (purifiable), i.e., robust to small, additively separable and independent perturbations of payoffs. These tools are applied to two examples. The first is a product choice game with 1-period memory of the firm's actions, obtaining a complete characterization of the exact minimum and maximum purifiable equilibrium payoffs for almost all discount factors and prior beliefs on an "honest" Stackelberg commitment type, which shows that non-stationary equilibria expand the equilibrium set. The second is the same game with long memory: in all stationary and purifiable equilibria, the long-run player obtains exactly the Stackelberg payoff so long as the memory is longer than a threshold dependent on the prior. These results show that the presence of the honest type (even for arbitrarily small prior beliefs) qualitatively changes the equilibrium set for any fixed discount factor above a threshold independent of the prior, thereby not requiring extreme patience. The third chapter studies the question of why drug trafficking organizations inflict violence on each other, and why conflict breaks out under some government crackdowns and not others, in a repeated games context. Violence between Mexican drug cartels soared following the government's anti-cartel offensive starting in 2006, but not under previous crackdowns. I construct a theoretical explanation for these observations and previous empirical research. I develop a duopoly model where the firms have the capacity to make costly attacks on each other. The firms use the threat of violence to incentivize inter-cartel cooperation, and under imperfect monitoring, violence occurs on the equilibrium path of a high payoff equilibrium. When a "corrupt" government uses the threat of law enforcement as a punishment for uncooperative behavior, violence is not needed as frequently to achieve high payoffs. When government cracks down indiscriminately, the firms may return to frequent violence as a way of ensuring cooperation and high payoffs, even if the crackdown makes drug trafficking otherwise less profitable.

Handbook Of Game Theory

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Author : Petyon Young
language : en
Publisher: Elsevier
Release Date : 2014-10-01

Handbook Of Game Theory written by Petyon Young and has been published by Elsevier this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-10-01 with Mathematics categories.

The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics

A Long Run Collaboration On Long Run Games

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Author : Drew Fudenberg
language : en
Publisher: World Scientific
Release Date : 2009

A Long Run Collaboration On Long Run Games written by Drew Fudenberg and has been published by World Scientific this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with Mathematics categories.

This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.

Environmental Quality And Pollution Saving Technological Change In A Two Sector Endogenous Growth Model

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Author : Arij Lans BOVENBERG
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993

Environmental Quality And Pollution Saving Technological Change In A Two Sector Endogenous Growth Model written by Arij Lans BOVENBERG and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with categories.

Negotiation Games

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Author : Steven J. Brams
language : en
Publisher: Psychology Press
Release Date : 2003

Negotiation Games written by Steven J. Brams and has been published by Psychology Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with Business & Economics categories.

Steven J. Brams is one of the leading game theorists of his generation. This new edition includes brand new material on topics such as fallback bargaining and principles of rational negotiation.