Robust Combinatorial Auction Formats
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Robust Combinatorial Auction Formats
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Author : Pavlo Shabalin
language : en
Publisher: Sudwestdeutscher Verlag Fur Hochschulschriften AG
Release Date : 2010
Robust Combinatorial Auction Formats written by Pavlo Shabalin and has been published by Sudwestdeutscher Verlag Fur Hochschulschriften AG this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with Auctions categories.
In a combinatorial auction (CA) several heterogeneous items are traded simultaneously, they can be distributed between several winners, and the bidders can submit indivisible all-or-nothing "bundle" bids on groups of items. CAs are getting increasingly popular for conducting negotiations on complex high-stakes markets, for example spectrum auctions and industrial procurement. The goal of this work is to suggest a practical and robust combinatorial auction format which delivers good results for various types of bidder valuations and strategies, including cases when the bidders do not follow the theoretically optimal strategy.
Alps Design And Analysis Of A Robust Iterative Combinatorial Auction Format
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Author : Pavlo Shabalin
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Alps Design And Analysis Of A Robust Iterative Combinatorial Auction Format written by Pavlo Shabalin and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
Pricing And Bidding Strategies In Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
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Author : Alexander Pikovsky
language : en
Publisher: VDM Publishing
Release Date : 2008
Pricing And Bidding Strategies In Iterative Combinatorial Auctions written by Alexander Pikovsky and has been published by VDM Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with Mathematics categories.
Iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs) are IT-based economic mechanisms in which bidders submit bundle bids iteratively and the auctioneer computes allocations and ask prices in each auction round. In addition to strategic problems, the design of such auction formats exhibits hard computational problems. More recently, researchers have focused on the pricing and information feedback in ICAs. This book presents the results of 5 years research in this field, whereas the emphasis was put on the practical applicability of considered auction designs and pricing mechanisms in these auctions. The main topic of this book is a comprehensive comparison of the most important auction designs proposed in the literature by means of computational and laboratory experiments. Additionally, the book presents a new auction design ALPS, which has been shown very efficient and robust in many settings. In laboratory experiments all considered auction designs were tested for practical applicability and robustness against diverse bidding strategies.
Risk Management For Combinatorial Auctions
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Author : Alan Holland
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Risk Management For Combinatorial Auctions written by Alan Holland and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Auctions categories.
Auction theory has traditionally regarded bids in auctions as enforceable commitments. We relax this important, yet often incorrect, assumption that is common to almost all prior literature on the subject. This work addresses the possibility of winning bids being withdrawn, or reneged upon, before a transaction is completed successfully. In particular, we examine the significance of winning-bid withdrawal in a combinatorial auction setting. We find that it may be difficult or even impossible for the bid-taker to find a repair solution of adequate revenue without causing undue disturbance to the remaining winning bids in the allocation. We have called this the bid-taker{u2019}s exposure problem and we also show that it is exacerbated for a risk averse bid-taker. It is preferable for the bid-taker to pre-empt uncertainty by choosing a solution that is robust to bid-withdrawal and provides a guarantee that possible with-drawls may be repaired easily with a bounded loss in revenue. We discuss the computational difficulties posed by risk management and investigate a constraint programming approach to tackling the problem. We also analyze the drawbacks of this approach and motivate useful extensions to the framework. We then propose a new framework that facilitates solution robustness for constraint programs in a wide range of settings. We briefly demonstrate its versatility with an application to job-shop scheduling. We then apply this new framework to combinatorial auctions in order to investigate the trade-off between robustness and revenue. We also introduce a new auction model that improves solution reparability by facilitating backtracking on winning bids by the bid-taker. We demonstrate experimentally that fewer winning bids partake in robust solutions, thereby reducing any associated overhead in dealing with extra bidders. Finally, we consider the case in which the bid-taker wishes to optimize some social objective, thereby necessitating truthful bidding. We have provided some impossibility results pertaining to truthful mechanism design that incorporate robust solutions. However, we also propose a means of circumventing this problem for restricted class of combinatorial auctions. We develop an approximate allocation algorithm that incentivizes truthful bidding whilst attaining an allocation that minimizes the risk of revenue loss in the event of a winning bid being withdrawn.
Auctions Market Mechanisms And Their Applications
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Author : Sanmay Das
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2009-07-31
Auctions Market Mechanisms And Their Applications written by Sanmay Das and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-07-31 with Computers categories.
These proceedings present the technical contributions to the First Conference on A- tions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA), held May 8-9, 2009 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The conference was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market mechanism to solve a problem, including theoretical and empirical examinations. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the conf- ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real world, including case studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an understanding of the economic and game-theoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks from economists and computer scientists, theorists and empiricists, academics and practitioners. The program, as reflected in these proceedings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets.
Handbook Of Spectrum Auction Design
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Author : Martin Bichler
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2017-10-26
Handbook Of Spectrum Auction Design written by Martin Bichler and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-10-26 with Business & Economics categories.
An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.
Market Design
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Author : Martin Bichler
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2017-12-21
Market Design written by Martin Bichler and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-12-21 with Business & Economics categories.
The introduction to market design discusses the theory and empirical results relevant for the design of multi-object auctions and matching.
Auction Theory
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Author : Vijay Krishna
language : en
Publisher: Academic Press
Release Date : 2009-09-28
Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and has been published by Academic Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-09-28 with Business & Economics categories.
Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Combinatorial Auctions
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Author : Peter C. Cramton
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
Release Date : 2006
Combinatorial Auctions written by Peter C. Cramton and has been published by MIT Press (MA) this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Business & Economics categories.
A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.
Risk Free Profit In Item Bidding Combinatorial Auctions
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Author : Gautam Rayaprolu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Risk Free Profit In Item Bidding Combinatorial Auctions written by Gautam Rayaprolu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
"Sequential and Simultaneous auctions are two well studied and commonly used auction formats. There have been a spate of results on the efficiency of equilibria in these games. Equilibria in these auctions are in general hard to compute, so it is unreasonable to expect that they will be attained. Instead, we introduce and consider a natural notion of \textit{risk free profitability} in these auctions. In the case of sequential auctions, we present a simple strategy which is optimal for Bidders with an XOS valuation. We also a demonstrate a strategy that is near optimal for a Bidder with a sub additive valuation over identical items. These results hold for both the first and second price setting. We demonstrate a quantitative difference between first and second price simultaneous auctions. We also show that the risk free profitability of simultaneous auctions is strictly greater than that of sequential auctions"--