Combinatorial Auctions
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Combinatorial Auctions
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Author : Peter C. Cramton
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
Release Date : 2006
Combinatorial Auctions written by Peter C. Cramton and has been published by MIT Press (MA) this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Business & Economics categories.
A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.
Combinatorial Auctions
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Author : Peter Cramton
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Combinatorial Auctions written by Peter Cramton and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.
Essays On Time Preference And Combinatorial Auctions
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Author : Kan Takeuchi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Essays On Time Preference And Combinatorial Auctions written by Kan Takeuchi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Risk Management For Combinatorial Auctions
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Author : Alan Holland
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Risk Management For Combinatorial Auctions written by Alan Holland and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Auctions categories.
Auction theory has traditionally regarded bids in auctions as enforceable commitments. We relax this important, yet often incorrect, assumption that is common to almost all prior literature on the subject. This work addresses the possibility of winning bids being withdrawn, or reneged upon, before a transaction is completed successfully. In particular, we examine the significance of winning-bid withdrawal in a combinatorial auction setting. We find that it may be difficult or even impossible for the bid-taker to find a repair solution of adequate revenue without causing undue disturbance to the remaining winning bids in the allocation. We have called this the bid-taker{u2019}s exposure problem and we also show that it is exacerbated for a risk averse bid-taker. It is preferable for the bid-taker to pre-empt uncertainty by choosing a solution that is robust to bid-withdrawal and provides a guarantee that possible with-drawls may be repaired easily with a bounded loss in revenue. We discuss the computational difficulties posed by risk management and investigate a constraint programming approach to tackling the problem. We also analyze the drawbacks of this approach and motivate useful extensions to the framework. We then propose a new framework that facilitates solution robustness for constraint programs in a wide range of settings. We briefly demonstrate its versatility with an application to job-shop scheduling. We then apply this new framework to combinatorial auctions in order to investigate the trade-off between robustness and revenue. We also introduce a new auction model that improves solution reparability by facilitating backtracking on winning bids by the bid-taker. We demonstrate experimentally that fewer winning bids partake in robust solutions, thereby reducing any associated overhead in dealing with extra bidders. Finally, we consider the case in which the bid-taker wishes to optimize some social objective, thereby necessitating truthful bidding. We have provided some impossibility results pertaining to truthful mechanism design that incorporate robust solutions. However, we also propose a means of circumventing this problem for restricted class of combinatorial auctions. We develop an approximate allocation algorithm that incentivizes truthful bidding whilst attaining an allocation that minimizes the risk of revenue loss in the event of a winning bid being withdrawn.
Winner Determination In Combinatorial Auctions
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Author : Thomas Elendner
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Winner Determination In Combinatorial Auctions written by Thomas Elendner and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.
Eine kombinatorische Auktion zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dassmehrere Objekte simultan versteigert werden und die Bieter Geboteauf Teilmengen von Objekten abgeben k onnen. Gibt es keinerleiBeschr ankungen bei der Gebotsabgabe, so gestaltet sich dieoptimale Zuordnung von Objekten zu Bietern (Gewinnerbestimmung) imAllgemeinen als NP--schwer. Dieses Buch besch aftigt sich vorrangig mit derGewinnerbestimmung; es werden Optimierungs -modelle zuspezifischen kombinatorischen Auktionen aufgestellt und f urausgew ahlte Modelle Algorithmen entwickelt und getestet. Im Zentrum der Arbeit wird untersucht, wie eine fiktiveUnternehmensleitung (Auktionator) mit Hilfe einer kombinatorischenAuktion Zeitfenster (Objekte) einer kapazit atsbeschr anktenProduktionsanlage auf Profit--Center (Bieter) verteilen kann. AlsOptimierungsmodell wird das Weighted Job Interval SchedulingProblem identifiziert; die daf ur entwickelte Lagrangeheuristikliefert in Rechenstudien im Mittel bessere untere Schrankenals eine aus der Literatur ausgew ahlte Heuristik. In einer Verallgemeinerung werden knappe Budgets von Seiten derProfit--Center angenommen. In Rechenstudien zeigt sich, dass eineentwickelte Lagrange--Dekompostion bessere obere Schranken als diedurch CPLEX berechnete LP--L osung liefert und die Heuristik imMittel gute untere Schranken findet. Des weiteren wird die Anwendung von kombinatorischen Auktionen inder Praxis analysiert; in einem Fall wird gezeigt, dass knappeRessourcen in einem grossen deutschen Versicherungsunternehmeneffizienter mit einer kombinatorischen Auktion als mit einem vondem Unternehmen vorgeschlagenen Verfahren verteilt werdenk onnen. Des weiteren wird ein Pilotprojekt von DaimlerChryslervorgestellt; hier wurde eine kombinatorische Ausschreibung zurBeschaffung von Transportkapazit at erfolgreich angewendet. [.5cm]In a combinatorial auction many items are put up for auctionsimultaneously and the bidders are allowed to place bids onsubsets of items. If no restrictions on placing bids do exist, theassignment of items to bidders (winner determination)is proven to be NP-hard in the general case. This book focuses on deriving mathematical models and algorithmsfor the winner determination problem. Mainly, we show how scarcetime slots (items) on a machine which is made available by theheadquarters (auctioneer) can be assigned to profit--centers(bidders) using a combinatorial auction. The Weighted Job IntervalScheduling Problem serves as winner determination problem; runtimestudies show that a Lagrangean heuristic outperforms a heuristictaken from the literature. Furthermore, we analyze the situation where the profit--centersare assumed to be budget--restricted. To solve the winnerdetermination problem a Lagrangean decomposition is used; runtimestudies show that our upper bounds outperform the LP--solutioncalculated by CPLEX and the proposed lower bounds seem to be tight. Afterwards, the application of combinatorial auctions in practiceis studied. We state an allocation problem at a large Germaninsurance company; it is shown, that combinatorial auctions canderive more efficient allocations than an algorithm proposed bythe company. Finally, we provide the experiences of the first useof a combinatorial reverse auction at DaimlerChrysler wheretransportation capacity was successfully procured.
Handbook Of Spectrum Auction Design
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Author : Martin Bichler
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2017-10-26
Handbook Of Spectrum Auction Design written by Martin Bichler and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-10-26 with Business & Economics categories.
An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.
Combinatorial Auctions
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Combinatorial Auctions written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Robust Combinatorial Auction Formats
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Author : Pavlo Shabalin
language : en
Publisher: Sudwestdeutscher Verlag Fur Hochschulschriften AG
Release Date : 2010
Robust Combinatorial Auction Formats written by Pavlo Shabalin and has been published by Sudwestdeutscher Verlag Fur Hochschulschriften AG this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with Auctions categories.
In a combinatorial auction (CA) several heterogeneous items are traded simultaneously, they can be distributed between several winners, and the bidders can submit indivisible all-or-nothing "bundle" bids on groups of items. CAs are getting increasingly popular for conducting negotiations on complex high-stakes markets, for example spectrum auctions and industrial procurement. The goal of this work is to suggest a practical and robust combinatorial auction format which delivers good results for various types of bidder valuations and strategies, including cases when the bidders do not follow the theoretically optimal strategy.
Truthful Randomized Mechanisms For Combinatorial Auctions
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Author : Shahar Dobzinski
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Truthful Randomized Mechanisms For Combinatorial Auctions written by Shahar Dobzinski and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.
Automata Languages And Programming
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Author : Luca Aceto
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2008-06-24
Automata Languages And Programming written by Luca Aceto and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008-06-24 with Computers categories.
ICALP 2008, the 35th edition of the International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, was held in Reykjavik, Iceland, July 7–11, 2008. ICALP is a series of annual conferences of the European Association for Th- reticalComputer Science(EATCS) which ?rsttook placein 1972.This year,the ICALP program consisted of the established Track A (focusing on algorithms, automata,complexityandgames)andTrackB(focusing onlogic,semanticsand theory of programming), and of the recently introduced Track C (focusing on security and cryptography foundations). In response to the call for papers, the Program Committees received 477 submissions, the highest ever: 269 for Track A, 122 for TrackB and 86 for Track C. Out of these, 126 papers were selected for inclusion in the scienti?c program: 70 papers for Track A, 32 for Track B and 24 for Track C. The selection was made by the Program Committees based on originality, quality, and relevance to theoretical computer science. The quality of the manuscripts was very high indeed, and many deserving papers could not be selected. ICALP 2008 consisted of ?ve invited lectures and the contributed papers.