Side Channel Attack Resistant Aes Design Based On Finite Field Construction Variation
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Side Channel Attack Resistant Aes Design Based On Finite Field Construction Variation
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Author : Phillip Shvartsman
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Side Channel Attack Resistant Aes Design Based On Finite Field Construction Variation written by Phillip Shvartsman and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with Cryptography categories.
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the current standard for symmetric key ciphers and is algorithmically secure. Side channel attacks that target power consumption can reveal the secret key in AES implementations. Masking data with random variables is one of the main methods used to thwart power analysis attacks. Data can be masked with multiple random variables to prevent higher-order attacks at the cost of a large increase in area. This thesis tests the plausibility of using varied finite field construction to prevent power analysis attacks as an alternative to masking. Initially, a design using finite field architecture as the sole countermeasure was investigated. This was followed by varied field construction in conjunction with a low entropy masking scheme. Neither approach provided an acceptable trade off between security and area. Analysis then turned to a combined Boolean and multiplicative masking scheme. Varied construction provided little gain for multiplicative masking. However, varied constructions were found to greatly increase security when used in conjunction with a Boolean random mask. A novel masking scheme for AES resistant to second-order attacks is proposed. Instead of an additional mask, variation in finite field construction is exploited to increase resistance to second-order attacks in Boolean masked shares. As a result, the area requirement is substantially reduced. For an example AES encryption, the proposed design is 12% smaller compared to the previous best design, with a small drop in achievable security level.
Side Channel Attack Resistance
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Author : Mike Borowczak
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Side Channel Attack Resistance written by Mike Borowczak and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
Our world is moving towards ubiquitous networked computing with unstoppable momentum. With technology available at our every finger tip, we expect to connect quickly, cheaply, and securely on the sleekest devices. While the past four decades of design automation research has focused on making integrated circuits smaller, cheaper and quicker the past decade has drawn more attention towards security. Though security within the scope of computing is a large domain, the focus of this work is on the elimination of computationally based power byproducts from high-level device models down to physical designs and implementationsThe scope of this dissertation is within the analysis, attack and protection of power based side channels. Research in the field concentrates on determining, masking and/or eliminating the sources of data dependent information leakage within designs. While a significant amount of research is allocated to reducing this leakage at low levels of abstraction, significantly less research effort has gone into higher levels of abstraction. This dissertation focuses on both ends of the design spectrum while motivating the future need for hierarchical side channel resistance metrics for hardware designs. Current low level solutions focus on creating perfectly balanced standard cells through various straight-forward logic styles. Each of these existing logic styles, while enhancing side channel resistance by reducing the channels' variance, come at significant design expense in terms of area footprint, power consumption, delay and even logic style structure. The first portion of this proposal introduces a universal cell based on a dual multiplexer, implemented using a pass-transistor logic which approaches and exceeds some standard cell cost benchmarks. The proposed cell and circuit level methods shows significant improvements in security metrics over existing cells and approaches standard CMOS cell and circuit performance by reducing area, power consumption and delay. While most low level works stop at the cell level, this work also investigates the impact of environmental factors on security. On the other end of the design spectrum, existing secure architecture and algorithm research attempts to mask side channels through random noise, variable timing, instruction reordering and other similar methods. These methods attempt to obfuscate the primary source of information with side channels. Unfortunately, in most cases, the techniques are still susceptible to attack - of those with promise, most are algorithm specific. This dissertation approaches high-level security by eliminating the relationship between high level side channel models and the side channels themselves. This work discusses two different solutions targeting architecture level protection. The first, deals with the protection of Finite State Machines, while the seconds deals with protection of a class of cryptographic algorithms using Feedback Shift Registers. This dissertation includes methods for reducing the power overhead of any FSM circuit (secured or not). The solutions proposed herein render potential side channel models moot by eliminating or reducing the model's data dependent variability. Designers unwilling to compromise on a doubling of area can include some sub-optimal security to their devices.
Side Channel Attacks
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Author : Seokhie Hong
language : en
Publisher: MDPI
Release Date : 2019-06-12
Side Channel Attacks written by Seokhie Hong and has been published by MDPI this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-06-12 with Technology & Engineering categories.
This Special Issue provides an opportunity for researchers in the area of side-channel attacks (SCAs) to highlight the most recent exciting technologies. The research papers published in this Special Issue represent recent progress in the field, including research on power analysis attacks, cache-based timing attacks, system-level countermeasures, and so on.