The First Price Sealed Bid Auction With Asymmetric Bidders

DOWNLOAD

Download The First Price Sealed Bid Auction With Asymmetric Bidders PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get The First Price Sealed Bid Auction With Asymmetric Bidders book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page

The First Price Sealed Bid Auction With Asymmetric Bidders

DOWNLOAD
Author : Patrick L. Bajari
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997

The First Price Sealed Bid Auction With Asymmetric Bidders written by Patrick L. Bajari and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with categories.

Elicited Bid Functions In A Symmetric First Price Auctions

DOWNLOAD
Author : Paul Pezanis-Christou
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005

Elicited Bid Functions In A Symmetric First Price Auctions written by Paul Pezanis-Christou and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.

Bilateral K 1 Price Auctions With Asymmetric Shares And Values

DOWNLOAD
Author : Cédric Wasser
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014

Bilateral K 1 Price Auctions With Asymmetric Shares And Values written by Cédric Wasser and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.

We study a sealed-bid auction between two bidders with asymmetric independent private values. The two bidders own asymmetric shares in a partnership. The higher bidder buys the lower bidder's shares at a per-unit price that is a convex combination of the two bids. The weight of the lower bid is denoted by k in [0,1]. We partially characterize equilibrium strategies and show that they are closely related to equilibrium strategies of two well-studied mechanisms: the double auction between a buyer and a seller and the first-price auction between two buyers (or two sellers). Combining results from those two branches of the literature enables us to prove equilibrium existence. Moreover, we find that there is a continuum of equilibria if k in (0,1) whereas the equilibrium is unique if k in {0,1}. Our approach also suggests a procedure for numerical simulations.

First Price Auctions With General Information Structures

DOWNLOAD
Author : Dirk Bergemann
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017

First Price Auctions With General Information Structures written by Dirk Bergemann and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with Auctions categories.

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between their equilibrium bids and all higher bids. Our results provide lower bounds for bids and revenue with asymmetric distributions over values. We also report further characterizations of revenue and bidder surplus including upper bounds on revenue. Our work has implications for the identification of value distributions from data on winning bids and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative bidding mechanisms.

Asymmetry And Risk Aversion In First Price Sealed Bid Auctions

DOWNLOAD
Author : Sandra Campo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002

Asymmetry And Risk Aversion In First Price Sealed Bid Auctions written by Sandra Campo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.

Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse

DOWNLOAD
Author : John H. Kagel
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2009-04-11

Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse written by John H. Kagel and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-04-11 with Business & Economics categories.

An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.

Linear Bid In Asymmetric First Price Auctions

DOWNLOAD
Author : Tadanobu Tanno
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009

Linear Bid In Asymmetric First Price Auctions written by Tadanobu Tanno and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.

We propose a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the eqilibrium linear bid in asymmetric first-price auctions with two bidders and uniform distributions. Introducing asymmetry in linear symmetric equilibrium increases expected revenue subject to constant expected sum of valuations. If auctions are asymmetric, the revenue in the linear equiibrium is larger than that in second-price auctions. If auctions in simple case are similar enough, the revenue in the first-price auction moves close to the optimal revenue as auctions are asymmetric. If auctions are similar enough, the linear equilibrium more efficiently allocates the item than the optimal mechanism.

To Thine Own Self Be True

DOWNLOAD
Author : Joel O. Wooten
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020

To Thine Own Self Be True written by Joel O. Wooten and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.

As procurement auctions increasingly move to digital platforms, more data and information is available (or can be made available) to bidders. Despite this trend, relatively little is known about the impact of information asymmetries in these settings. We investigate two such differences in first-price sealed-bid reverse auctions with a common value. In a design that mirrors real construction procurement auctions, our laboratory experiment tests the impact of the precision of a bidder's cost estimate and the degree to which bidders know the inherent cost estimate precisions in the auction. We find that more understanding of estimate precision decreases bidder profit, counter to our expectation; however, we also find evidence of strategic behavior from those bidders that ratchets up pressure on competitors and pushes competitors toward bankruptcy. Most notably, understanding just one's own precision can help avoid the winner's curse in some settings. The same result does not apply if bidders also know their competitor's precision; more information does not help. The implication from our realistic setting - that reduced uncertainty may not help - raises important questions about the degree of transparency that is optimal in procurement auctions.

Sealed Bid Auctions With Uncertainty Averse Bidders

DOWNLOAD
Author : Kin Chung Lo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1998

Sealed Bid Auctions With Uncertainty Averse Bidders written by Kin Chung Lo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998 with categories.

Traditional analysis of auctions assumes that each bidder's beliefs about opponents' valuations are represented by a probability measure. Motivated by experimental findings such as the Ellsberg Paradox, this paper examines the consequences of relaxing this assumption in the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values. The multiple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18 (1989), 141-153] is adopted specifically to represent the bidders' (and the auctioneer's) preferences. The unique equilibrium bidding strategy in the first price auction is derived. Moreover, under an interesting parametric specialization of the model, it is shown that the first price auction Pareto dominates the second price auction.

Nonparametric Identication And Structural Estimation Of Auction Models

DOWNLOAD
Author : Ming He
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016

Nonparametric Identication And Structural Estimation Of Auction Models written by Ming He and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with Auction theory categories.

This dissertation contributes to the structural auction literature in two different auction models, namely the pure common value model and the affiliated private value model. The goal of structural analysis of auction data is to recover the model primitives and to provide policy guidance for welfare analysis. In Chapter 1, we study identification in the first-price and the second-price sealed-bid auctions within the pure common value framework. In Chapter 2, we apply the identification results and estimation method in Chapter 1 to analyze the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) wildcat auction data and provide policy guidance for welfare analysis. In Chapter 3, we develop identification and partial identification results for the first-price and the second-price sealed-bid auction models with affiliated private values and incomplete sets of bids. Chapter 1: In this chapter, we establish novel identification results for both the first-price and the second-price sealed-bid auction models within the pure common value framework. We show that the policy parameters, including the expected total welfare, the seller's expected revenue, and the bidders' expected surplus under any reserve price are identified for a general nonparametric class of latent joint distributions when the ex-post common value is unobserved. Moreover, we establish that these policy parameters are nonparametric identified without normalization assumption when the ex-post common value is observed. We propose a semiparametric estimation method and establish consistency of the estimator. Results from Monte Carlo experiments reveal good finite sample performance of the estimator. Chapter 2: In this chapter, we employ the identification strategy and estimation method in Chapter 1 to analyze data from the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) wildcat auctions in the pure common value framework. We study the welfare implication of different counterfactual reserve prices, focusing on the cases with two and three bidders. The empirical results suggest that if the U.S. government had set reserve prices optimally using the newly-developed econometric method in Chapter 1, its expected revenue can be increased by around $34\%$ and $30\%$ for these two cases, respectively. Lastly, we compare our results with those estimated under the affiliated private value framework, and find that the estimated welfare curves under the two different frameworks are very different. Chapter 3: In this chapter, we address the identification issue in the first-price sealed-bid affiliated private value model when an incomplete set of bids is observed. In the simple case with symmetric bidders and non-binding reserve price, we establish identification or partial identification results in two scenarios of practical interest. First, when the two highest bids are observed, we achieve identification of the joint distribution function of private values by assuming the copula function of private values to be a nonparametric Archimedean copula with weak requirement. Second, when only the highest bid is observed, we establish partial identification for the quantile function of private value and several policy parameters by parameterizing the copula function. Further, we extend the identification/partial identification results to the cases with asymmetric bidders and/or binding reserve price. We also extend our identification/partial identification results to the second-price sealed-bid auction.