The Moral Hazard Of Imf Lending
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The Moral Hazard Of Imf Lending
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Author : Peter Nunnenkamp
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
The Moral Hazard Of Imf Lending written by Peter Nunnenkamp and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with categories.
Moral Hazard
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Author : Mr.Timothy D. Lane
language : en
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Release Date : 2002-05-03
Moral Hazard written by Mr.Timothy D. Lane and has been published by International Monetary Fund this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002-05-03 with Business & Economics categories.
"This Economic Issue is based on IMF Working Paper WP/00/168, 'Does IMF financing result in moral hazard?', October 2000"--Page iii.
Can The Moral Hazard Caused By Imf Bailouts Be Reduced
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Author : Barry J. Eichengreen
language : en
Publisher: Centre for Economic Policy Research
Release Date : 2000
Can The Moral Hazard Caused By Imf Bailouts Be Reduced written by Barry J. Eichengreen and has been published by Centre for Economic Policy Research this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Business & Economics categories.
Economics literature emphasizes the need to limit IMF financial rescues, but inaction is too painful. This first "Special Report" argues that institutional reforms are needed if the international policy community is to succeed in containing the moral hazard caused by IMF financial rescues.
The Mussa Theorem And Other Results On Imf Induced Moral Hazard
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Author : Olivier Jeanne
language : en
Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Release Date : 2004-10-01
The Mussa Theorem And Other Results On Imf Induced Moral Hazard written by Olivier Jeanne and has been published by INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004-10-01 with categories.
Using a simple model of international lending, we show that as long as the IMF lends at an actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximize the welfare of their taxpayers, any changes in policy effort, capital flows, or borrowing costs in response to IMF crisis lending are efficient. Thus, under these assumptions, the IMF cannot cause moral hazard, as argued by Michael Mussa (1999, 2004). It follows that examining the effects of IMF lending on capital flows or borrowing costs is not a useful strategy to test for IMF-induced moral hazard. Instead, empirical research on moral hazard should focus on the assumptions of the Mussa theorem.
Bank Lending Under Imf Lending In A Financial Crisis
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Author : Barbara Döbeli
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002
Bank Lending Under Imf Lending In A Financial Crisis written by Barbara Döbeli and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.
A Theory Of International Crisis Lending And Imf Conditionality
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Author : Olivier Jeanne
language : en
Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Release Date : 2008-10-01
A Theory Of International Crisis Lending And Imf Conditionality written by Olivier Jeanne and has been published by INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008-10-01 with categories.
We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the return of private capital, and ensuring repayment to the IMF. Nonetheless, moral hazard can arise if there are crisis externalities across countries (contagion) or if country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum, or both. Moral hazard can be avoided by making IMF lending conditional on crisis prevention efforts-"ex ante" conditionality.
Global Moral Hazard Capital Account Liberalization And The Overlending Syndrome
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Author : Mr.Eduardo Levy Yeyati
language : en
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Release Date : 1999-07-01
Global Moral Hazard Capital Account Liberalization And The Overlending Syndrome written by Mr.Eduardo Levy Yeyati and has been published by International Monetary Fund this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999-07-01 with Business & Economics categories.
The removal of government guarantees in borrowing countries does not eliminate the moral hazard problem posed by the existence of deposit guarantees in lender countries. The paper shows that, after restrictions on international capital flows are lifted, banks in low-risk developed countries benefit from lending funds captured in home markets at low deposit rates to high-risk/high-yield projects in emerging economies, even though these projects command lower expected returns. This, in turn, has a negative impact on bank profitability in the borrowing country, even when foreign funds are intermediated through domestic banks. The results are consistent with the surge in international bank lending flows that led to recent banking crises in Asia.
Moral Hazard And International Crisis Lending
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Author : Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
language : en
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Release Date : 2002-10
Moral Hazard And International Crisis Lending written by Giovanni Dell'Ariccia and has been published by International Monetary Fund this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002-10 with Business & Economics categories.
We test for the existence of a moral hazard effect attributable to official crisis lending by analyzing the evolution of sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets before and after the Russian crisis. The nonbailout of Russia in August 1998 is interpreted as an event that decreased the perceived probability of future crisis lending to emerging markets. In the presence of moral hazard, such an event should raise not only the level of spreads, but also the sensitivity with which spreads reflect fundamentals as well as their cross-country dispersion. We find strong evidence for all three effects.
Unconditional Imf Financial Support And Investor Moral Hazard
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Author : Jun Il Kim
language : en
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Release Date : 2007-05
Unconditional Imf Financial Support And Investor Moral Hazard written by Jun Il Kim and has been published by International Monetary Fund this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007-05 with Business & Economics categories.
This paper develops a simple model of international lending, and calibrates it to assess quantitatively the effects of contingent IMF financial support on the risk premiums and the crisis probability. In the model, the country borrows in both short and long term; market (coordination) failure triggers a liquidity run and inefficient default; and the IMF lends unconditionally under a preferred creditor status. The model shows that IMF financial support can help prevent a liquidity crisis without causing investor moral hazard by helping to remove a distortion-effectively subsidizing ex post short-term investors (who run for the exit) at the expense of long-term investors (who are locked in). The resulting equilibrium is welfare enhancing as both the country's borrowing costs and the likelihood of a crisis are lower. The calibration exercises suggest that IMF-induced investor moral hazard-which occurs if the IMF lends at a subsidized rate-is unlikely to be a concern in practice, particularly if the country's economic fundamentals are strong and short-term debt is small.
Does Imf Financing Result In Moral Hazard
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Author : Mr.Timothy D. Lane
language : en
Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Release Date : 2000-10-01
Does Imf Financing Result In Moral Hazard written by Mr.Timothy D. Lane and has been published by INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000-10-01 with Business & Economics categories.
The view that the IMF’s financial support gives rise to moral hazard has become increasingly prominent in policy discussions, particularly following the 1995 Mexican crisis. This paper seeks to clarify a number of conceptual issues and bring some basic empirical evidence to bear on this hypothesis. While some element of moral hazard is a logical consequence of the IMF’s financial support, such moral hazard is difficult to detect in market reactions to various IMF policy announcements and there is no evidence that such moral hazard has recently been on the rise.