To Bid Or Not To Bid Aggressively
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To Bid Or Not To Bid Aggressively
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Author : Philipp Herrmann
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
To Bid Or Not To Bid Aggressively written by Philipp Herrmann and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
To Bid Or Not To Bid
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Author : Larry Cohen
language : en
Publisher: Master Point Press
Release Date : 2002
To Bid Or Not To Bid written by Larry Cohen and has been published by Master Point Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with Games & Activities categories.
To bid or not to bid -- the perennial dilemma in competitive auctions. The easy answer to the question lies in the correct use of the Law of Total Tricks. The LAW has been part of bridge literature since the 1950s, but it was in this book that Larry Cohen brought it to the attention of the majority of bridge players. Still the most lucid explanation of the LAW ever published, this is a book that every bridge player needs to own, to read, to re-read, and to study in order to improve their results.
Bidding For Concessions
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Author : Michael Klein
language : en
Publisher: World Bank Publications
Release Date : 1998
Bidding For Concessions written by Michael Klein and has been published by World Bank Publications this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998 with Auctions categories.
En la última década ha sido práctica común la privatización de empresas gestoras de infraestructura, en sectores como el del transporte, las telecomunicaciones, la energía y el agua. Muy a menudo se adjudican a empresas privadas franquicias monopolistas, mediante concesiones a largo plazo. En este trabajo se analizan aquellas cuestiones relacionadas con el diseño de estos contratos de concesión y su adjudicación a empresas privadas.
To Bid Or Not To Bid
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Author : Larry Cohen
language : en
Publisher: Weidenfeld & Nicolson
Release Date : 1992
To Bid Or Not To Bid written by Larry Cohen and has been published by Weidenfeld & Nicolson this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1992 with Contract bridge categories.
One of the most difficult areas in bridge is competitive bidding at part-score and game levels. This book deals with this problem and introduces the Law of Total Tricks. The Law, based on the trump holdings of both sides, is of value in competitive bidding as it allows a more accurate judgement to be made as to whether to continue or whether to go for penalties. This book explains the Law in simple terms.
Commonsense Bidding
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Author : William S. Root
language : en
Publisher: Crown
Release Date : 2010-11-10
Commonsense Bidding written by William S. Root and has been published by Crown this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-11-10 with Games & Activities categories.
The most complete guide to the modern methods of standard bidding for bridge, from one of America's leading players, teachers, and authorities. With a logical, easy-to-follow style, William Root covers all the bidding essentials.
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse
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Author : John H. Kagel
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2021-04-13
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse written by John H. Kagel and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021-04-13 with Business & Economics categories.
An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Bids As A Vehicle Of Mis Information
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Author : Marco Pagnozzi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Bids As A Vehicle Of Mis Information written by Marco Pagnozzi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
In an English auction, a bidder's strategy depends on the prices at which his competitors drop out, because these convey information on the value of the object on sale. A ring of colluding bidders can strategically manipulate the information transmitted through its members' bids, in order to mislead other bidders into bidding less aggressively and thus allow a designated bidder to bid more aggressively. Collusion increases the probability that the ring wins the auction and reduces the price it pays. The presence of a ring harms other bidders (as well as the seller) and reduces efficiency.
Auction Behavior
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Author : Youxin Hu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Auction Behavior written by Youxin Hu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with Consumer behavior categories.
Abstract: Standard literature on auctions considers isolated markets with bidders that are ex ante identical and independent. My dissertation research considers the behavior of bidders and sellers when they take into account other auctions and bidders' relative roles outside of a given auction. I further extend this investigation through classroom experiments. In the first chapter, I study bidders' optimal strategies under negative externalities (i.e., the auction may incur losses (instead of zero payoffs) to the losing bidders). I construct a model of auction with three bidders. One bidder is special in the sense that if he wins, both of the other bidders will incur a loss; the other two bidders are regular in the sense that as in a traditional auction, if one of them wins, the losing bidders will receive zero payoffs. Intuitively one expects regular bidders to bid more aggressively than normal to avoid the loss. However, I find that in an ascending clock auction, in equilibrium regular bidders bid less aggressively and quit before reaching their private values. This occurs because a regular bidder may have to bid above his value in order to win against the special bidder and thus risks negative profit by bidding aggressively. Since both regular bidders avoid the externality if either wins, there is a free riding incentive. Despite free riding, in most cases the clock auction is ex post efficient However, in first-price sealed bid auctions free riding and aggressive bidding incentives are simultaneous, so ex post efficiency is less frequent. I also conducted classroom experiments which suggest that bidders more often exhibit aggressive bidding rather than free riding in an ascending clock auction; furthermore, I show that in first-price sealed bid auctions, regular bidders bid more aggressively than the special bidder, indicating aggressive bidding incentives dominate free riding incentives. In the second chapter, I construct an auction model in which both number of bidders and sellers' reserve prices are endogenously determined, and estimate the value distribution among eBay bidders. I assume each bidder has a choice of auctions with different reserve prices and other auction specific factors (seller's reputation, shipping cost, auction duration, etc.). I show that in equilibrium, 1) each bidder must be indifferent to entry in any auction, and 2) each seller's reserve price must maximize expected revenue given auction structure and bidder entry behavior, which jointly determines the equilibrium number of bidders in each auction. Few theoretical works have been done to find the positive optimal reserve price when the number of bidder is endogenous. And previous empirical work usually uses observed bids to estimate bidders' value distribution and take sellers' choice (e.g., reserve prices) as exogenous. Based on the equilibrium relationship described above, my model allows estimation of bidders' value distribution not only from observed bids, but also from the number of bidders and reserve prices. To apply this structural estimation method, I use eBay digital camera auction data to estimate bidders' value distribution from bid observations and reserve prices.
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Author :
language : en
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
Release Date :
written by and has been published by DIANE Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on with categories.
Negotiation Analysis
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Author : Howard Raiffa
language : en
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Release Date : 2007-03-31
Negotiation Analysis written by Howard Raiffa and has been published by Harvard University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007-03-31 with Business & Economics categories.
This masterly book substantially extends Howard Raiffa's earlier classic, The Art and Science of Negotiation. It does so by incorporating three additional supporting strands of inquiry: individual decision analysis, judgmental decision making, and game theory. Each strand is introduced and used in analyzing negotiations. The book starts by considering how analytically minded parties can generate joint gains and distribute them equitably by negotiating with full, open, truthful exchanges. The book then examines models that disengage step by step from that ideal. It also shows how a neutral outsider (intervenor) can help all negotiators by providing joint, neutral analysis of their problem. Although analytical in its approach--building from simple hypothetical examples--the book can be understood by those with only a high school background in mathematics. It therefore will have a broad relevance for both the theory and practice of negotiation analysis as it is applied to disputes that range from those between family members, business partners, and business competitors to those involving labor and management, environmentalists and developers, and nations.