Unemployment Insurance And Work Effort
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Unemployment Insurance And Work Effort
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Author : Derek Hum
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1981
Unemployment Insurance And Work Effort written by Derek Hum and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1981 with Business & Economics categories.
The Work Disincentive Effects Of Unemployment Insurance
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Author : Raymond Munts
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1974
The Work Disincentive Effects Of Unemployment Insurance written by Raymond Munts and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1974 with Business & Economics categories.
Report on the work disincentive effects of unemployment benefit in the USA - analyses the increased unemployment effects and counter-business cycle effects on selected population groups, and includes theoretics and empirical studies. References and statistical tables.
Designing Labor Market Institutions In Emerging And Developing Economies
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Author : Mr.Romain A Duval
language : en
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Release Date : 2019-05-21
Designing Labor Market Institutions In Emerging And Developing Economies written by Mr.Romain A Duval and has been published by International Monetary Fund this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-05-21 with Business & Economics categories.
This paper discusses theoretical aspects and evidences related to designing labor market institutions in emerging market and developing economies. This note reviews the state of theory and evidence on the design of labor market institutions in a developing economy context and then reviews its consistency with actual labor market advice in a selected set of emerging and developing economies. The focus is mainly on three broad sets of institutions that matter for both workers’ protection and labor market efficiency: employment protection, unemployment insurance and social assistance, minimum wages and collective bargaining. Text mining techniques are used to identify IMF recommendations in these areas in Article IV Reports for 30 emerging and frontier economies over 2005–2016. This note has provided a critical review of the literature on the design of labor market institutions in emerging and developing market economies, and benchmarked the advice featured in IMF recommendations for 30 emerging market and frontier economies against the tentative conclusions from the literature.
Optimal Unemployment Insurance
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Author : Andreas Pollak
language : en
Publisher: Mohr Siebeck
Release Date : 2007
Optimal Unemployment Insurance written by Andreas Pollak and has been published by Mohr Siebeck this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with Business & Economics categories.
Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using theoretical economic models and complex numerical simulations, he studies the effects of benefit levels and payment durations on unemployment and welfare. As the models allow for considerable heterogeneity of households, including a history-dependent labor productivity, it is possible to analyze how certain policies affect individuals in a specific age, wealth or skill group. The most important aspect of an unemployment insurance system turns out to be the benefits paid to the long-term unemployed. If this parameter is chosen too high, a large number of households may get caught in a long spell of unemployment with little chance of finding work again. Based on the predictions in these models, the so-called "Hartz IV" labor market reform recently adopted in Germany should have highly favorable effects on the unemployment rates and welfare in the long run.
Rethinking Unemployment And The Work Ethic
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Author : A. Dunn
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2014-10-07
Rethinking Unemployment And The Work Ethic written by A. Dunn and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-10-07 with Social Science categories.
While recent Labour and coalition governments have insisted that many unemployed people prefer state benefits to a job, and have tightened the rules attached to claiming unemployment benefits, mainstream academic research repeatedly concludes that only a tiny minority of unemployed benefit claimants are not strongly committed to employment. Andrew Dunn argues that the discrepancy can be explained by UK social policy academia leaving important questions unanswered. Dunn presents findings from four empirical studies which, in contrast to earlier research, focused on unemployed people's attitudes towards unattractive jobs and included interviews with people in welfare-to-work organisations. All four studies' findings were consistent with the view that many unemployed benefit claimants prefer living on benefits to undertaking jobs which would increase their income, but which they find unattractive. Thus, the studies gave support to politicians' view about the need to tighten benefit rules.
Job Search And Unemployment Insurance New Evidence From Time Use Data
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Author : Alan B. Krueger
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
Job Search And Unemployment Insurance New Evidence From Time Use Data written by Alan B. Krueger and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with Job hunting categories.
This paper provides new evidence on job search intensity of the unemployed in the U.S., modeling job search intensity as time allocated to job search activities. The main findings are: 1) the average unemployed worker in the U.S. devotes about 41 minutes to job search on weekdays, which is substantially more than his or her European counterpart; 2) workers who expect to be recalled by their previous employer search substantially less than the average unemployed worker; 3) across the 50 states and D.C., job search is inversely related to the generosity of unemployment benefits, with an elasticity between -1.6 and -2.2; 4) the predicted wage is a strong predictor of time devoted to job search, with an elasticity in excess of 2.5; 5) job search intensity for those eligible for Unemployment Insurance (UI) increases prior to benefit exhaustion; 6) time devoted job search is fairly constant regardless of unemployment duration for those who are ineligible for UI. A nonparametric Monte Carol technique suggests that the relationship between job search effort and the duration of unemployment for a cross-section of job seekers is only slightly biased by length-based sampling.
Unemployment Insurance And Job Search Productivity
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Author : Pierre-Yves Crémieux
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1995
Unemployment Insurance And Job Search Productivity written by Pierre-Yves Crémieux and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1995 with Insurance, Unemployment categories.
Unemployment Insurance In Theory And Practice
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Author : National Industrial Conference Board
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1922
Unemployment Insurance In Theory And Practice written by National Industrial Conference Board and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1922 with Insurance, Unemployment categories.
The Impact Of Unemployment Insurance On Wages Search Intensity And The Probability Of Re Employment
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Author : Pierre-Yves Crémieux
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1995
The Impact Of Unemployment Insurance On Wages Search Intensity And The Probability Of Re Employment written by Pierre-Yves Crémieux and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1995 with Employment re-entry categories.
Unemployment Insurance And Duration Of Unemployment
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Author : Milan Vodopivec
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
Unemployment Insurance And Duration Of Unemployment written by Milan Vodopivec and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with categories.
December 1995 Would shortening the duration of unemployment benefits shorten the period of unemployment? In Slovenia, and probably in other transition economies with generous benefits, the answer is yes. Why not consider converting unemployment benefits into hiring subsidies? Between 1990 and 1992 in Slovenia, recipients of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits tended to remain (formally) unemployed until their benefits expired, before taking a job. Institutional set-up suggests, and labor surveys show, that many of the recipients were actually working while collecting UI benefits. In the spirit, if not in the letter of the law, the UI system was abused. Vodopivec shows that the escape rate of the recipients of unemployment compensation to employment increased dramatically just before the potential exhaustion of unemployment benefits -- and decreased equally dramatically after benefits were exhausted. When grouped by the potential duration of benefits, unemployment length varies significantly. The unemployed with longer potential benefits stay unemployed longer. Because these groups differ in their characteristics (for example, in age), this does not prove the waiting behavior of the recipients. However, exits to employment dramatically increase just before exhaustion -- and that does prove waiting behavior. The pattern of an increased escape rate just before benefits are exhausted and its dramatic fall thereafter is more rigorously demonstrated using hazard model estimation. Possibilities for informal employment are abundant in Slovenia, and the environment of transition economies generally seems conducive to misuse of the UI system. Legislative loopholes and failure to enforce the labor code allowed the unemployed to work and to collect benefits. And the monitoring of job searches was lax. Vodopivec's calculations suggest that reducing the duration of benefits would reduce the incidence of unemployment, its duration, the amount spent on UI benefits, and the inefficiencies generated by raising taxes to finance unemployment insurance. At the same time, reducing the duration of benefits would not impair job matches or crowd out jobs for nonrecipients. True, despite increased efficiency generally, the workers with the least job mobility might suffer hardships -- and might need social assistance. The tradeoff between increased hardships for the least mobile group and greater efficiency generally would have to be resolved in the political sphere. Redesigning the system for better targeting would be less controversial. One way to reduce UI spending without seriously curtailing incentives to work would be to reduce the benefits in proportion to earnings from irregular work. Another possibility is stricter monitoring of the job searches of the unemployed. To reduce spending and make double dipping less attractive, old-age insurance could be removed from the package of benefits the UI system offers. And counselors who help the unemployed find jobs (and who may thus develop a close relationship with them) should perhaps not be expected to be able to make impartial decisions about disqualification for benefits; someone else should do that. In addition to better targeting, a benefit transfer program -- a voluntary program that converts UI benefits (through vouchers) into hiring subsidies -- seems particularly attractive for Slovenia and other transition economies. In a way, such a program would legalize the double-dipping that has been taking place in Slovenia and possibly elsewhere. It would legalize practices that have undermined the system's credibility. But it might improve fiscal savings while sustaining the incentive to find jobs. This paper -- a product of the Transition Economics Division, Policy Research Department -- is part of a larger effort in the department to investigate labor markets in transitional economies. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Labor Market Dynamics during the Transition of a Socialist Economy (RPO 677-20).