Adenauer And Kennedy
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Adenauer And Kennedy
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Author : Frank A. Mayer
language : en
Publisher: MacMillan
Release Date : 1996
Adenauer And Kennedy written by Frank A. Mayer and has been published by MacMillan this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Germany categories.
German-American relations during the years 1961-1963 were characterized by tension and disagreement as President John F. Kennedy attempted to redefine America's commitment to German reunification, one of the major foreign policy priorities of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Frank Mayer focuses on how this process of redefinition affected the Berlin Wall Crisis of 1961-1962. Adenauer and Kennedy also analyzes how Adenauer overcame the hostility displayed by the American government toward the Franco-German Treaty of January 1963, which Adenauer believed was a necessary and historic component of his policy of reconciliation with France. Adenauer and Kennedy demonstrates how the events of this period continue to influence contemporary relations between America and a united Germany. Anyone interested in the current state of German-American relations will want to read this fascinating book.
Kennedy Adenauer And The Making Of The Berlin Wall 1958 1961
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Author : Fabian Rueger
language : en
Publisher: Stanford University
Release Date : 2011
Kennedy Adenauer And The Making Of The Berlin Wall 1958 1961 written by Fabian Rueger and has been published by Stanford University this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Kennedy, Adenauer and the Making of the Berlin Wall, 1958-1961 The Second Berlin Crisis, which began with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany in November 1958, has largely been interpreted by foreign policy historians as a conflict between the superpowers, in which the dependent allies - the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR - had almost no influence on the course of events that led to the erection of the Berlin Wall. This interpretation served the political purposes of the governments involved for most of the Cold War. The Kennedy administration as leading government of the Western world could claim to have successfully managed a difficult crisis; the Adenauer administration and the Ulbricht regime could both point to Washington's and Moscow's responsibility for the division of Germany's capital; and Khrushchev, as leading statesman of the Warsaw pact, could finally deliver on some of his promises made to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, recent findings suggest that Ulbricht, not Khrushchev, was the driving force behind the decision to close the East Berlin sector. In the course of the first two years of the Kennedy administration, severe problems arose in West German-American relations. It is time to ask how the West German government's interactions with the Kennedy administration influenced the course of the crisis. President Eisenhower had seemingly managed to avoid an escalation of the Berlin crisis from 1958 to late 1960. This came at the cost of increasing pressure for his successor to find a solution. Ten months into the Kennedy administration, Berlin was divided by a wall, and American and Soviet tanks faced each other at Checkpoint Charlie. This dissertation reexamines the interactions between the Western governments, in particular between West Germany and the United States during the Second Berlin Crisis, and shows how these affected the outcome of the crisis. The first chapter serves as an introduction to the historiography of the Berlin Crisis and German-American relations in the period, especially between the Kennedy and Adenauer governments, and defines the pertinent questions; the second chapter provides an outline of the first two years of the crisis and the Eisenhower administration's approach to Adenauer and Berlin, especially as to Western policy on Berlin when the Eisenhower administration handed over the reins; the third to fifth chapters trace the Kennedy administration's and Chancellor Adenauer's interactions during the crisis in 1961 with particular regard to the actual sealing off of West Berlin, and the last chapter finally serves as an overview of the immediate aftermath. I argue that four key assumptions about the Berlin Wall crisis in 1961 can no longer be upheld: 1. The claim that Kennedy had stood firm on Berlin and merely continued the Eisenhower posture on Berlin is wrong. Instead, the Kennedy administration attempted to find new approaches to Berlin and Germany in line with its general revision of US foreign policy. 2. The notion that the closing of the sector border came as a surprise is not supported by the documents. President Kennedy had been informed numerous times that a closing of the sector border could be expected within the year. 3. Adenauer's policy to prevent diplomatic recognition of the GDR contributed to an escalation of Washington's search for alternative policy options, rather than slowing them. The West German election campaign in 1961 further limited the chancellor's willingness to make changes to his foreign policy. The Kennedy administration eventually sought accommodation with Khrushchev without consulting Bonn. 4. Inherent conceptual mistakes in Kennedy's early foreign policy agenda exacerbated the crisis, rather than contributed to its eventual solution. An additional lack of trust between West Germany and the United States complicated and delayed the attempt to find a more coherent, unified Western approach. All four Western governments anticipated an end to the refugee flow through West Berlin as the first step in a crisis escalation, while developing no contingency plans for this step. The lack of any political intention to prevent the expected stop of the refugee flow became the casting mould for Ulbricht's plan to close the sector border, a plan Khrushchev eventually made his own. By leaving Ulbricht and Khrushchev with only one option, Western policies on Berlin and Germany unwillingly conspired to force East Germany to face its systemic flaws in the summer of 1961.
The Eec Crisis Of 1963
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Author : O. Bange
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 1999-09-22
The Eec Crisis Of 1963 written by O. Bange and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999-09-22 with History categories.
This fresh look at the 1963 crisis in the western alliance following de Gaulle's veto of the British EEC application uses much new unpublished source material to offer a fascinating insight into the personal relationships of the western leaders. It challenges the orthodox view, showing that the ultimate breakdown came after Anglo-German and Anglo-American cooperation to ensure that de Gaulle was made the sole scapegoat, in order to isolate France within the EEC.
Kennedy Adenauer And The Making Of The Berlin Wall 1958 1961
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Author : Fabian Rueger
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Kennedy Adenauer And The Making Of The Berlin Wall 1958 1961 written by Fabian Rueger and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Kennedy, Adenauer and the Making of the Berlin Wall, 1958-1961 The Second Berlin Crisis, which began with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany in November 1958, has largely been interpreted by foreign policy historians as a conflict between the superpowers, in which the dependent allies - the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR - had almost no influence on the course of events that led to the erection of the Berlin Wall. This interpretation served the political purposes of the governments involved for most of the Cold War. The Kennedy administration as leading government of the Western world could claim to have successfully managed a difficult crisis; the Adenauer administration and the Ulbricht regime could both point to Washington's and Moscow's responsibility for the division of Germany's capital; and Khrushchev, as leading statesman of the Warsaw pact, could finally deliver on some of his promises made to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, recent findings suggest that Ulbricht, not Khrushchev, was the driving force behind the decision to close the East Berlin sector. In the course of the first two years of the Kennedy administration, severe problems arose in West German-American relations. It is time to ask how the West German government's interactions with the Kennedy administration influenced the course of the crisis. President Eisenhower had seemingly managed to avoid an escalation of the Berlin crisis from 1958 to late 1960. This came at the cost of increasing pressure for his successor to find a solution. Ten months into the Kennedy administration, Berlin was divided by a wall, and American and Soviet tanks faced each other at Checkpoint Charlie. This dissertation reexamines the interactions between the Western governments, in particular between West Germany and the United States during the Second Berlin Crisis, and shows how these affected the outcome of the crisis. The first chapter serves as an introduction to the historiography of the Berlin Crisis and German-American relations in the period, especially between the Kennedy and Adenauer governments, and defines the pertinent questions; the second chapter provides an outline of the first two years of the crisis and the Eisenhower administration's approach to Adenauer and Berlin, especially as to Western policy on Berlin when the Eisenhower administration handed over the reins; the third to fifth chapters trace the Kennedy administration's and Chancellor Adenauer's interactions during the crisis in 1961 with particular regard to the actual sealing off of West Berlin, and the last chapter finally serves as an overview of the immediate aftermath. I argue that four key assumptions about the Berlin Wall crisis in 1961 can no longer be upheld: 1. The claim that Kennedy had stood firm on Berlin and merely continued the Eisenhower posture on Berlin is wrong. Instead, the Kennedy administration attempted to find new approaches to Berlin and Germany in line with its general revision of US foreign policy. 2. The notion that the closing of the sector border came as a surprise is not supported by the documents. President Kennedy had been informed numerous times that a closing of the sector border could be expected within the year. 3. Adenauer's policy to prevent diplomatic recognition of the GDR contributed to an escalation of Washington's search for alternative policy options, rather than slowing them. The West German election campaign in 1961 further limited the chancellor's willingness to make changes to his foreign policy. The Kennedy administration eventually sought accommodation with Khrushchev without consulting Bonn. 4. Inherent conceptual mistakes in Kennedy's early foreign policy agenda exacerbated the crisis, rather than contributed to its eventual solution. An additional lack of trust between West Germany and the United States complicated and delayed the attempt to find a more coherent, unified Western approach. All four Western governments anticipated an end to the refugee flow through West Berlin as the first step in a crisis escalation, while developing no contingency plans for this step. The lack of any political intention to prevent the expected stop of the refugee flow became the casting mould for Ulbricht's plan to close the sector border, a plan Khrushchev eventually made his own. By leaving Ulbricht and Khrushchev with only one option, Western policies on Berlin and Germany unwillingly conspired to force East Germany to face its systemic flaws in the summer of 1961.
The Eec Crisis Of 1963
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Author : O. Bange
language : en
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Release Date : 1999-12-30
The Eec Crisis Of 1963 written by O. Bange and has been published by Palgrave Macmillan this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999-12-30 with History categories.
This fresh look at the 1963 crisis in the western alliance following de Gaulle's veto of the British EEC application uses much new unpublished source material to offer a fascinating insight into the personal relationships of the western leaders. It challenges the orthodox view, showing that the ultimate breakdown came after Anglo-German and Anglo-American cooperation to ensure that de Gaulle was made the sole scapegoat, in order to isolate France within the EEC.
The Ambivalent Alliance
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Author : Ronald J. Granieri
language : en
Publisher: Berghahn Books
Release Date : 2004
The Ambivalent Alliance written by Ronald J. Granieri and has been published by Berghahn Books this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with Biography & Autobiography categories.
The opening of various personal and party archives over the past few years has now made the entire Adenauer era accessible for historians. Using this material to re-examine existing conventional wisdom about the period, the text traces the roles of Adenauer and the CDU/CSU is shaping the Westbindung.
Berlin 1961
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Author : Frederick Kempe
language : en
Publisher: Penguin
Release Date : 2011-05-10
Berlin 1961 written by Frederick Kempe and has been published by Penguin this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011-05-10 with History categories.
In June 1961, Nikita Khrushchev called Berlin "the most dangerous place on earth." He knew what he was talking about. Much has been written about the Cuban Missile Crisis a year later, but the Berlin Crisis of 1961 was more decisive in shaping the Cold War-and more perilous. It was in that hot summer that the Berlin Wall was constructed, which would divide the world for another twenty-eight years. Then two months later, and for the first time in history, American and Soviet fighting men and tanks stood arrayed against each other, only yards apart. One mistake, one nervous soldier, one overzealous commander-and the tripwire would be sprung for a war that could go nuclear in a heartbeat. On one side was a young, untested U.S. president still reeling from the Bay of Pigs disaster and a humiliating summit meeting that left him grasping for ways to respond. It would add up to be one of the worst first-year foreign policy performances of any modern president. On the other side, a Soviet premier hemmed in by the Chinese, East Germans, and hardliners in his own government. With an all-important Party Congress approaching, he knew Berlin meant the difference not only for the Kremlin's hold on its empire-but for his own hold on the Kremlin. Neither man really understood the other, both tried cynically to manipulate events. And so, week by week, they crept closer to the brink. Based on a wealth of new documents and interviews, filled with fresh-sometimes startling-insights, written with immediacy and drama, Berlin 1961 is an extraordinary look at key events of the twentieth century, with powerful applications to these early years of the twenty-first. Includes photographs
Berlin 1961 Kennedy Khruschev And The Most Dangerous Place On Earth
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Author : Frederick Kempe
language : en
Publisher: Penguin UK
Release Date : 2012-06-07
Berlin 1961 Kennedy Khruschev And The Most Dangerous Place On Earth written by Frederick Kempe and has been published by Penguin UK this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-06-07 with History categories.
'A mind-shaking work of investigative history' (Wall Street Journal) Checkpoint Charlie, 27 October 1961. At 9pm on a damp night, the Cold War reaches crisis point. US and Soviet tanks face off across the East-West divide, only yards apart. One mistake, one nervous soldier, could spring the tripwire for nuclear war... Frederick Kempe's gripping book tells the story of the Cold War's most dramatic year, when Berlin became what Khrushchev called 'the most dangerous place on earth'. Kempe re-creates the war of nerves between the young, untested President Kennedy and the bombastic Soviet leader as they squared off over the future of a divided city. He interweaves this with stories of the ordinary citizens whose lives were torn apart when the Berlin Wall went up - and the world came to the brink of disaster.
Konrad Adenauer
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Author : Hans-Peter Schwarz
language : en
Publisher: Berghahn Books
Release Date : 1995
Konrad Adenauer written by Hans-Peter Schwarz and has been published by Berghahn Books this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1995 with Germany categories.
Kennedy And The Berlin Wall
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Author : W. R. Smyser
language : en
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
Release Date : 2009-09-16
Kennedy And The Berlin Wall written by W. R. Smyser and has been published by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-09-16 with History categories.
The Berlin Wall Crisis dominated the presidency of John F. Kennedy from his inauguration in 1961 until his historic trip to the city in June 1963. W.R. Smyser's Kennedy and the Berlin Wall offers new insights into the Berlin events that riveted global attention, especially as Soviet and American tanks faced each other at point-blank range over "Checkpoint Charlie." Drawing on his experience as an American diplomat in Berlin at the time; personal interviews; memoirs; and Soviet, East German, and American documents, Smyser ties together the full story of what actually happened on the ground and in world capitals.