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Kennedy Adenauer And The Making Of The Berlin Wall 1958 1961


Kennedy Adenauer And The Making Of The Berlin Wall 1958 1961
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Kennedy Adenauer And The Making Of The Berlin Wall 1958 1961


Kennedy Adenauer And The Making Of The Berlin Wall 1958 1961
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Author : Fabian Rueger
language : en
Publisher: Stanford University
Release Date : 2011

Kennedy Adenauer And The Making Of The Berlin Wall 1958 1961 written by Fabian Rueger and has been published by Stanford University this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.


Kennedy, Adenauer and the Making of the Berlin Wall, 1958-1961 The Second Berlin Crisis, which began with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany in November 1958, has largely been interpreted by foreign policy historians as a conflict between the superpowers, in which the dependent allies - the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR - had almost no influence on the course of events that led to the erection of the Berlin Wall. This interpretation served the political purposes of the governments involved for most of the Cold War. The Kennedy administration as leading government of the Western world could claim to have successfully managed a difficult crisis; the Adenauer administration and the Ulbricht regime could both point to Washington's and Moscow's responsibility for the division of Germany's capital; and Khrushchev, as leading statesman of the Warsaw pact, could finally deliver on some of his promises made to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, recent findings suggest that Ulbricht, not Khrushchev, was the driving force behind the decision to close the East Berlin sector. In the course of the first two years of the Kennedy administration, severe problems arose in West German-American relations. It is time to ask how the West German government's interactions with the Kennedy administration influenced the course of the crisis. President Eisenhower had seemingly managed to avoid an escalation of the Berlin crisis from 1958 to late 1960. This came at the cost of increasing pressure for his successor to find a solution. Ten months into the Kennedy administration, Berlin was divided by a wall, and American and Soviet tanks faced each other at Checkpoint Charlie. This dissertation reexamines the interactions between the Western governments, in particular between West Germany and the United States during the Second Berlin Crisis, and shows how these affected the outcome of the crisis. The first chapter serves as an introduction to the historiography of the Berlin Crisis and German-American relations in the period, especially between the Kennedy and Adenauer governments, and defines the pertinent questions; the second chapter provides an outline of the first two years of the crisis and the Eisenhower administration's approach to Adenauer and Berlin, especially as to Western policy on Berlin when the Eisenhower administration handed over the reins; the third to fifth chapters trace the Kennedy administration's and Chancellor Adenauer's interactions during the crisis in 1961 with particular regard to the actual sealing off of West Berlin, and the last chapter finally serves as an overview of the immediate aftermath. I argue that four key assumptions about the Berlin Wall crisis in 1961 can no longer be upheld: 1. The claim that Kennedy had stood firm on Berlin and merely continued the Eisenhower posture on Berlin is wrong. Instead, the Kennedy administration attempted to find new approaches to Berlin and Germany in line with its general revision of US foreign policy. 2. The notion that the closing of the sector border came as a surprise is not supported by the documents. President Kennedy had been informed numerous times that a closing of the sector border could be expected within the year. 3. Adenauer's policy to prevent diplomatic recognition of the GDR contributed to an escalation of Washington's search for alternative policy options, rather than slowing them. The West German election campaign in 1961 further limited the chancellor's willingness to make changes to his foreign policy. The Kennedy administration eventually sought accommodation with Khrushchev without consulting Bonn. 4. Inherent conceptual mistakes in Kennedy's early foreign policy agenda exacerbated the crisis, rather than contributed to its eventual solution. An additional lack of trust between West Germany and the United States complicated and delayed the attempt to find a more coherent, unified Western approach. All four Western governments anticipated an end to the refugee flow through West Berlin as the first step in a crisis escalation, while developing no contingency plans for this step. The lack of any political intention to prevent the expected stop of the refugee flow became the casting mould for Ulbricht's plan to close the sector border, a plan Khrushchev eventually made his own. By leaving Ulbricht and Khrushchev with only one option, Western policies on Berlin and Germany unwillingly conspired to force East Germany to face its systemic flaws in the summer of 1961.



Kennedy Adenauer And The Making Of The Berlin Wall 1958 1961


Kennedy Adenauer And The Making Of The Berlin Wall 1958 1961
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Author : Fabian Rueger
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011

Kennedy Adenauer And The Making Of The Berlin Wall 1958 1961 written by Fabian Rueger and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.


Kennedy, Adenauer and the Making of the Berlin Wall, 1958-1961 The Second Berlin Crisis, which began with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany in November 1958, has largely been interpreted by foreign policy historians as a conflict between the superpowers, in which the dependent allies - the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR - had almost no influence on the course of events that led to the erection of the Berlin Wall. This interpretation served the political purposes of the governments involved for most of the Cold War. The Kennedy administration as leading government of the Western world could claim to have successfully managed a difficult crisis; the Adenauer administration and the Ulbricht regime could both point to Washington's and Moscow's responsibility for the division of Germany's capital; and Khrushchev, as leading statesman of the Warsaw pact, could finally deliver on some of his promises made to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, recent findings suggest that Ulbricht, not Khrushchev, was the driving force behind the decision to close the East Berlin sector. In the course of the first two years of the Kennedy administration, severe problems arose in West German-American relations. It is time to ask how the West German government's interactions with the Kennedy administration influenced the course of the crisis. President Eisenhower had seemingly managed to avoid an escalation of the Berlin crisis from 1958 to late 1960. This came at the cost of increasing pressure for his successor to find a solution. Ten months into the Kennedy administration, Berlin was divided by a wall, and American and Soviet tanks faced each other at Checkpoint Charlie. This dissertation reexamines the interactions between the Western governments, in particular between West Germany and the United States during the Second Berlin Crisis, and shows how these affected the outcome of the crisis. The first chapter serves as an introduction to the historiography of the Berlin Crisis and German-American relations in the period, especially between the Kennedy and Adenauer governments, and defines the pertinent questions; the second chapter provides an outline of the first two years of the crisis and the Eisenhower administration's approach to Adenauer and Berlin, especially as to Western policy on Berlin when the Eisenhower administration handed over the reins; the third to fifth chapters trace the Kennedy administration's and Chancellor Adenauer's interactions during the crisis in 1961 with particular regard to the actual sealing off of West Berlin, and the last chapter finally serves as an overview of the immediate aftermath. I argue that four key assumptions about the Berlin Wall crisis in 1961 can no longer be upheld: 1. The claim that Kennedy had stood firm on Berlin and merely continued the Eisenhower posture on Berlin is wrong. Instead, the Kennedy administration attempted to find new approaches to Berlin and Germany in line with its general revision of US foreign policy. 2. The notion that the closing of the sector border came as a surprise is not supported by the documents. President Kennedy had been informed numerous times that a closing of the sector border could be expected within the year. 3. Adenauer's policy to prevent diplomatic recognition of the GDR contributed to an escalation of Washington's search for alternative policy options, rather than slowing them. The West German election campaign in 1961 further limited the chancellor's willingness to make changes to his foreign policy. The Kennedy administration eventually sought accommodation with Khrushchev without consulting Bonn. 4. Inherent conceptual mistakes in Kennedy's early foreign policy agenda exacerbated the crisis, rather than contributed to its eventual solution. An additional lack of trust between West Germany and the United States complicated and delayed the attempt to find a more coherent, unified Western approach. All four Western governments anticipated an end to the refugee flow through West Berlin as the first step in a crisis escalation, while developing no contingency plans for this step. The lack of any political intention to prevent the expected stop of the refugee flow became the casting mould for Ulbricht's plan to close the sector border, a plan Khrushchev eventually made his own. By leaving Ulbricht and Khrushchev with only one option, Western policies on Berlin and Germany unwillingly conspired to force East Germany to face its systemic flaws in the summer of 1961.



The Berlin Wall


The Berlin Wall
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Author : Norman Gelb
language : en
Publisher: Touchstone
Release Date : 1988

The Berlin Wall written by Norman Gelb and has been published by Touchstone this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1988 with History categories.




Kennedy And The Berlin Wall


Kennedy And The Berlin Wall
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Author : W. R. Smyser
language : en
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
Release Date : 2009-09-16

Kennedy And The Berlin Wall written by W. R. Smyser and has been published by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-09-16 with History categories.


The Berlin Wall Crisis dominated the presidency of John F. Kennedy from his inauguration in 1961 until his historic trip to the city in June 1963. W.R. Smyser's Kennedy and the Berlin Wall offers new insights into the Berlin events that riveted global attention, especially as Soviet and American tanks faced each other at point-blank range over "Checkpoint Charlie." Drawing on his experience as an American diplomat in Berlin at the time; personal interviews; memoirs; and Soviet, East German, and American documents, Smyser ties together the full story of what actually happened on the ground and in world capitals.



Adenauer And Kennedy


Adenauer And Kennedy
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Author : Frank A. Mayer
language : en
Publisher: MacMillan
Release Date : 1996

Adenauer And Kennedy written by Frank A. Mayer and has been published by MacMillan this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Germany categories.


German-American relations during the years 1961-1963 were characterized by tension and disagreement as President John F. Kennedy attempted to redefine America's commitment to German reunification, one of the major foreign policy priorities of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Frank Mayer focuses on how this process of redefinition affected the Berlin Wall Crisis of 1961-1962. Adenauer and Kennedy also analyzes how Adenauer overcame the hostility displayed by the American government toward the Franco-German Treaty of January 1963, which Adenauer believed was a necessary and historic component of his policy of reconciliation with France. Adenauer and Kennedy demonstrates how the events of this period continue to influence contemporary relations between America and a united Germany. Anyone interested in the current state of German-American relations will want to read this fascinating book.



Harold Macmillan And The Berlin Wall Crisis 1958 62


Harold Macmillan And The Berlin Wall Crisis 1958 62
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Author : J. Gearson
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 1998-01-12

Harold Macmillan And The Berlin Wall Crisis 1958 62 written by J. Gearson and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998-01-12 with History categories.


Drawing on newly released government papers, John Gearson assesses the development of Harold Macmillan's foreign policy during the Berlin Wall Crisis. Tracing the bitter alliance disputes of the crisis, Dr Gearson shows how Macmillan's attempts to chart an independent course, crucially undermined his standing with his European partners and revealed his confused approach to European security. Berlin is placed at the centre of consideration of British foreign policy, making this book an important contribution to the historiography of the period.



The Ides Of August


The Ides Of August
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Author : Curtis Cate
language : en
Publisher: Weidenfeld & Nicolson
Release Date : 1978

The Ides Of August written by Curtis Cate and has been published by Weidenfeld & Nicolson this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1978 with History categories.


Cate beskriver ikke alene de politiske begivenheder omkring bygningen af Berlinmuren, men også nogle af de personlige tragedier det indebar at splitte hele kvarterer op.



Kennedy Khrushchev And The Berlin Cuba Crisis 1961 1964


Kennedy Khrushchev And The Berlin Cuba Crisis 1961 1964
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Author : John C. Ausland
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996

Kennedy Khrushchev And The Berlin Cuba Crisis 1961 1964 written by John C. Ausland and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Biography & Autobiography categories.




The Berlin Crisis 1958 1962


The Berlin Crisis 1958 1962
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Author : Jack M. Schick
language : en
Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press Anniversary Collection
Release Date : 1971

The Berlin Crisis 1958 1962 written by Jack M. Schick and has been published by University of Pennsylvania Press Anniversary Collection this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1971 with History categories.


An account of one of the most important and revealing events in the cold war.



The Use And Utility Of Ultimata In Coercive Diplomacy


The Use And Utility Of Ultimata In Coercive Diplomacy
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Author : Tim Sweijs
language : en
Publisher: Springer Nature
Release Date : 2023-05-12

The Use And Utility Of Ultimata In Coercive Diplomacy written by Tim Sweijs and has been published by Springer Nature this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023-05-12 with Political Science categories.


Ultimata feature as a core concept in the coercive diplomacy scholarship. Conventional wisdom holds that pursuing an ultimatum strategy is risky. This book shows that the conventional wisdom is wrong on the basis of a new dataset of 87 ultimata issued from 1920–2020. It provides a historical examination of ultimata in Western strategic, political, and legal thought since antiquity until the present, and offers a four-pronged typology that explains their various purposes and effects: 1) the dictate, 2) the conditional war declaration, 3) the bluff, and 4) the brinkmanship ultimatum. The book yields a better understanding of interstate threat behaviour at a time of surging competition. Background materials can be consulted at www.coercivediplomacy.com.