Bargaining With Incomplete Information
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Bargaining With Incomplete Information
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Author : Peter B. Linhart
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1992
Bargaining With Incomplete Information written by Peter B. Linhart and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1992 with Business & Economics categories.
These 22 contributions to the economic theory of non co-operative bargaining show how incomplete information, small numbers of agents, and the rules governing negotiation interact to cause inefficiency, indeterminacy and delay in bargaining outcomes.
Differential Information Economies
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Author : Dionysius Glycopantis
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2005-12-28
Differential Information Economies written by Dionysius Glycopantis and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005-12-28 with Business & Economics categories.
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.
Game Theoretic Models Of Bargaining
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Author : Alvin E. Roth
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 1985-11-29
Game Theoretic Models Of Bargaining written by Alvin E. Roth and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1985-11-29 with Business & Economics categories.
This book provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory.
Repeated Games With Incomplete Information
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Author : Robert J. Aumann
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 1995
Repeated Games With Incomplete Information written by Robert J. Aumann and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1995 with Business & Economics categories.
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Axiomatic Models Of Bargaining
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Author : A.E. Roth
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06
Axiomatic Models Of Bargaining written by A.E. Roth and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.
The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely.
A General Theory Of Equilibrium Selection In Games
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Author : John C. Harsanyi
language : en
Publisher: Mit Press
Release Date : 1988
A General Theory Of Equilibrium Selection In Games written by John C. Harsanyi and has been published by Mit Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1988 with Business & Economics categories.
The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well.By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality.The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.John C. Harsanyi is Flood Research Professor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Reinhard Selten is Professor of Economics Institute of Social and Economic Sciences: University of Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.
Unfinished Business
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Author : Guy Olivier Faure
language : en
Publisher: University of Georgia Press
Release Date : 2012-08-01
Unfinished Business written by Guy Olivier Faure and has been published by University of Georgia Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-08-01 with Political Science categories.
Most studies of international negotiations take successful talks as their subject. With a few notable exceptions, analysts have paid little attention to negotiations ending in failure. The essays in Unfinished Business show that as much, if not more, can be learned from failed negotiations as from successful negotiations with mediocre outcomes. Failure in this study pertains to a set of negotiating sessions that were convened for the purpose of achieving an agreement but instead broke up in continued disagreement. Seven case studies compose the first part of this volume: the United Nations negotiations on Iraq, the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David in 2000, Iran-European Union negotiations, the Cyprus conflict, the Biological Weapons Convention, the London Conference of 1830–33 on the status of Belgium, and two hostage negotiations (Waco and the Munich Olympics). These case studies provide examples of different types of failed negotiations: bilateral, multilateral, and mediated (or trilateral). The second part of the book analyzes empirical findings from the case studies as causes of failure falling in four categories: actors, structure, strategy, and process. This is an analytical framework recommended by the Processes of International Negotiation, arguably the leading society dedicated to research in this area. The last section of Unfinished Business contains two summarizing chapters that provide broader conclusions—lessons for theory and lessons for practice.
Papers In Game Theory
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Author : J.C. Harsanyi
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2010-12-30
Papers In Game Theory written by J.C. Harsanyi and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-12-30 with Philosophy categories.
This volume contains twelve of my game-theoretical papers, published in the period of 1956-80. It complements my Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation, Reidel, 1976, and my Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge University Press, 1977. These twelve papers deal with a wide range of game-theoretical problems. But there is a common intellectual thread going though all of them: they are all parts of an attempt to generalize and combine various game-theoretical solution concepts into a unified solution theory yielding one-point solutions for both cooperative and noncooperative games, and covering even such 'non-classical' games as games with incomplete information. SECTION A The first three papers deal with bargaining models. The first one discusses Nash's two-person bargaining solution and shows its equivalence with Zeuthen's bargaining theory. The second considers the rationality postulates underlying the Nash-Zeuthen theory and defends it against Schelling's objections. The third extends the Shapley value to games without transferable utility and proposes a solution concept that is at the same time a generaliza tion of the Shapley value and of the Nash bargaining solution.
Bargaining In The Shadow Of The Market
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Author : Kalyan Chatterjee
language : en
Publisher: World Scientific
Release Date : 2013
Bargaining In The Shadow Of The Market written by Kalyan Chatterjee and has been published by World Scientific this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with Language Arts & Disciplines categories.
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market OCo Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining consists of selected research in bargaining carried out by Kalyan Chatterjee by himself and with various co-authors. Chatterjee has been one of the earliest researchers to work on noncooperative bargaining theory and has contributed to bilateral bargaining with parties having private information as well as multilateral coalition formation models. Some of his work in each of these areas finds place here.The main theme of this collection of papers is the nature of negotiations when participants have alternatives to continue negotiating, either by beginning negotiations with a different partner or set of partners or by engaging in time-consuming search for such partners. Chapters in this book include: a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining and features a laboratory experiment relevant to this theory as well as an extension to political negotiations, search for alternative partners, the effect of markets and bargaining on incentives of players to invest in the partnership and related papers on incentive compatibility, arbitration and a dynamic model of negotiation. The book also includes a new introduction that puts these papers in the context of the broader literature in the field.