Bidder Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions Evidence From Swedish Treasury Auctions
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Bidder Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions Evidence From Swedish Treasury Auctions
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Author : Kjell G. Nyborg
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Bidder Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions Evidence From Swedish Treasury Auctions written by Kjell G. Nyborg and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second, we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner's curse-driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies. Third, we explore the extent to which the received theories of multiunit auctions are able to offer insights into the bidder behavior we observe. Our empirical evidence is consistent with some of the predictions of the models of auctions that emphasize private information, the winner's curse, and the champion's plague. While the models of multiunit auctions serve as useful guideposts, our empirical findings also point to several new areas of research in multiunit auctions that are of policy and theoretical interest.
Bidder Behavior In Multiple Unit Auctions
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Author : Kjell G. Nyborg
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997
Bidder Behavior In Multiple Unit Auctions written by Kjell G. Nyborg and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with Government securities categories.
Bidder Behavior In Multi Unit Ascending Auctions
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Author : Laurent Lamy
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Bidder Behavior In Multi Unit Ascending Auctions written by Laurent Lamy and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Strategic Behaviour And Underpricing In Uniform Price Auctions
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Author : Matti Keloharju
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002
Strategic Behaviour And Underpricing In Uniform Price Auctions written by Matti Keloharju and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with Government securities categories.
Bidding Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions
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Author : Dirk Engelmann
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Bidding Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions written by Dirk Engelmann and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.
We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with at demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.
Bidding Behaviour In Multi Unit Auctions
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Author : Rebecca Catherine Elskamp
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Bidding Behaviour In Multi Unit Auctions written by Rebecca Catherine Elskamp and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
This thesis contains three essays on the topic of bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions. The first essay develops and experimentally tests multi-unit auction theory to identify the effects of "scaling up" multi-unit auction environments on individual bidding behaviour. A uniquely tractable environment is developed that leads to the construction of uniform auctions of different scales, where the prediction is that risk neutral bidders' bids on the last unit they demand are independent of scale. Two main effects were observed in the experimental data. Regardless of scale, bidders were found to bid more aggressively than predicted by the theory. Secondly, small scale effects were observed, as bids were more aggressive in the small scale relative to the larger scale treatment. The theoretical consequences of risk aversion, joy of winning, and anticipated regret are analyzed to explain these deviations from predictions. The second essay provides empirical evidence on how economic agents converge to optimality. Learning direction theory is applied to bidding behaviour from the Ontario dairy quota auction, following a change in pricing rule from uniform to discriminatory. Two dimensions of bidding behaviour are examined at the individual bidder level, bid prices and number of price-quantity bid pairs. Adjustments in bidding behaviour are broadly consistent with the ex-post rationality. Experience acquired under the discriminatory pricing rule is found to have diminishing effects on adjustments made to bidding behaviour, consistent with bidders converging towards optimality. The third essay examines the effect of two simultaneous policy changes, implemented in the Ontario dairy quota auction, to determine whether these changes were successful in achieving performance goals. Results of a series of regression models indicate that these two policy changes had no effect on clearing prices. Rather, these two policy changes were found to significantly reduce revenue from quantity purchased, total quantity transferred and total quantity offered. The combination of a significant reduction in bid prices and individual quantity demanded, paralleled by an increase in individual quantity offered appears to have been the underlying mechanisms, in terms of individual bidding/offering behaviour, through which the these two policies failed to meet performance goals.
Treasury Bill Auctions
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Author : Mr.Carlo Cottarelli
language : en
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Release Date : 1994-11-01
Treasury Bill Auctions written by Mr.Carlo Cottarelli and has been published by International Monetary Fund this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1994-11-01 with Business & Economics categories.
We review the main issues that arise in the design of treasury bill auctions and survey the relevant empirical literature. We also provide a detailed description of the actual design of these auctions in a sample of 42 industrial and developing countries.
Multi Unit Auctions
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Author : Anthony M. Kwasnica
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Multi Unit Auctions written by Anthony M. Kwasnica and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
Large Scale Multi Item Auctions
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Author : Sascha Michael Schweitzer
language : en
Publisher: KIT Scientific Publishing
Release Date : 2014-10-16
Large Scale Multi Item Auctions written by Sascha Michael Schweitzer and has been published by KIT Scientific Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-10-16 with Business & Economics categories.
This book presents two experimental studies that deal with the comparison of multi-item auction designs for two specific applications: the sale of 2.6 GHz radio spectrum rights in Europe, and the sale of emissions permits in Australia. In order to tackle the complexity of these experiments, a cognitively based toolkit is proposed, including modularized video instructions, comprehension tests, a learning platform, a graphical one-screen user interface, and comprehension-based group matching.
Bidder Behavior In Uniform Pricing Auctions An Empirical Study Of The Danish Treasury Bill Auctions
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Author : Heino Dossing
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Bidder Behavior In Uniform Pricing Auctions An Empirical Study Of The Danish Treasury Bill Auctions written by Heino Dossing and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
In this paper I analyze the bidder behavior in uniform-pricing auctions. The paper contains a description of the most fundamental theory on discriminatory and uniform pricing auctions, a review of the existing literature and a unique empirical study of the bidder behavior in the Danish Treasury-Bill auction of 2007. The bidder-behavior in the Danish T-bill auctions was compared to the predictions of four different theoretical models via a methodology developed by Keloharju, Nyborg and Rydqvist (2005). It is found that the individual bidder's behavior is unaffected by risk and market power. Thus, price volatility and market power do not determine the profitability of the Danish T-bill Auctions. This leads to a suspicion of tacit collusion among the bidders in the Danish Treasury Bill auctions. As a consequence my empirical results could not contribute to a further mapping of the theoretical predictions on actual bidder behavior in Treasury security auctions that are confirmed by empirical data. In addition I did not come closer to an answer to the question: which auction procedure is most profitable - discriminatory or the uniform-pricing?However, my findings do add one interesting aspect to the existing literature: the relative profitability of any auction procedure can be affected by the degree of tacit collusion. Thus, any future comparisons of discriminatory and uniform-pricing auctions (across different countries or different time-periods) should take the possibility of collusion into account. Finally, future empirical studies of the bidder behavior in Treasury-security auctions could be devoted to the development of quantitative tools to detect collusion.