Bidding Behaviour In Multi Unit Auctions
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Bidding Behaviour In Multi Unit Auctions
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Author : Rebecca Catherine Elskamp
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Bidding Behaviour In Multi Unit Auctions written by Rebecca Catherine Elskamp and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
This thesis contains three essays on the topic of bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions. The first essay develops and experimentally tests multi-unit auction theory to identify the effects of "scaling up" multi-unit auction environments on individual bidding behaviour. A uniquely tractable environment is developed that leads to the construction of uniform auctions of different scales, where the prediction is that risk neutral bidders' bids on the last unit they demand are independent of scale. Two main effects were observed in the experimental data. Regardless of scale, bidders were found to bid more aggressively than predicted by the theory. Secondly, small scale effects were observed, as bids were more aggressive in the small scale relative to the larger scale treatment. The theoretical consequences of risk aversion, joy of winning, and anticipated regret are analyzed to explain these deviations from predictions. The second essay provides empirical evidence on how economic agents converge to optimality. Learning direction theory is applied to bidding behaviour from the Ontario dairy quota auction, following a change in pricing rule from uniform to discriminatory. Two dimensions of bidding behaviour are examined at the individual bidder level, bid prices and number of price-quantity bid pairs. Adjustments in bidding behaviour are broadly consistent with the ex-post rationality. Experience acquired under the discriminatory pricing rule is found to have diminishing effects on adjustments made to bidding behaviour, consistent with bidders converging towards optimality. The third essay examines the effect of two simultaneous policy changes, implemented in the Ontario dairy quota auction, to determine whether these changes were successful in achieving performance goals. Results of a series of regression models indicate that these two policy changes had no effect on clearing prices. Rather, these two policy changes were found to significantly reduce revenue from quantity purchased, total quantity transferred and total quantity offered. The combination of a significant reduction in bid prices and individual quantity demanded, paralleled by an increase in individual quantity offered appears to have been the underlying mechanisms, in terms of individual bidding/offering behaviour, through which the these two policies failed to meet performance goals.
Bidding Behaviour In Multi Unit Auctions
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Author : Dirk Engelmann
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Bidding Behaviour In Multi Unit Auctions written by Dirk Engelmann and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
Bidding Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions
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Author : Dirk Engelmann
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Bidding Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions written by Dirk Engelmann and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.
We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with at demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.
Bidder Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions Evidence From Swedish Treasury Auctions
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Author : Kjell G. Nyborg
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Bidder Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions Evidence From Swedish Treasury Auctions written by Kjell G. Nyborg and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second, we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner's curse-driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies. Third, we explore the extent to which the received theories of multiunit auctions are able to offer insights into the bidder behavior we observe. Our empirical evidence is consistent with some of the predictions of the models of auctions that emphasize private information, the winner's curse, and the champion's plague. While the models of multiunit auctions serve as useful guideposts, our empirical findings also point to several new areas of research in multiunit auctions that are of policy and theoretical interest.
Characterization Of Bidding Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions And Applications
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Author : Luciano I. de Castro Filho
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Characterization Of Bidding Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions And Applications written by Luciano I. de Castro Filho and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Auction Format And Auction Sequence In Multi Item Multi Unit Auctions An Experimental Study
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Author : Regina Betz
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Auction Format And Auction Sequence In Multi Item Multi Unit Auctions An Experimental Study written by Regina Betz and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed-bid vs. closed clock vs. open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous vs. sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi-unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed-bid auctions in terms of efficiency and revenues. This advantage disappears when the items are auctioned sequentially. In addition, auctioning sequentially has positive effects on total revenues across all auction formats, resulting from fiercer competition on the item auctioned first.
Auctions Of Identical Objects With Single Unit Demands
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Author : Flavio M. Menezes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
Auctions Of Identical Objects With Single Unit Demands written by Flavio M. Menezes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with Auctions categories.
Two Essays On Bidding In Multi Unit Common Value Auctions
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Author : Minjie Shao
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Two Essays On Bidding In Multi Unit Common Value Auctions written by Minjie Shao and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with Auctions categories.
This dissertation consists of two essays on the topic of bidding in multi-unit common value auction. Essay one examines the role of capacity constraint on the auction results and bidding behavior. We consider a general case where bidders are unconstrained, and a second setting where bidders are capacity constrained. We document downward sloping demand curves for individual bidders. Bidders shade their bids by submitting quantity-price pairs and spreading their bids. The winner's curse is strong in the unconstrained treatment, but we find no evidence of the winner's curse when bidding constraints are imposed. Unconstrained bidders shade bids significantly more and their quantity-weighted prices are much lower than those in the constrained treatment. Interacting with the information structure, the capacity constraint has a significant impact on the auction results including the market clearing price, market efficiency, and the degree of market concentration. We provide evidence that efficient price discovery in multi-unit auctions with diverse information is possible, but careful attention to auction design will make this outcome more likely. Essay two examines how the introduction of a noncompetitive bidding option affects outcomes in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The experimental design incorporates many of the characteristics of the markets that pertain to the issuance of new equity securities. Important features of the bidding environment include endogenous bidder entry, costly information acquisition, bidders that differ by capacity constraint, and substantial uncertainty with respect to the intrinsic value. We use a standard uniform-price auction as our baseline setting where only competitive bids are accepted. Our results show that introducing the noncompetitive bidding option improves auction performance by increasing revenue and reducing price error. Underpricing is found in both treatments, but is less severe in the presence of the noncompetitive bidding option. The incorporation of this option significantly increases both the small bidder participation rate and allocation, and reduces the incentive for small bidders to free ride by submitting extremely high bids. Under both treatments, information acquisition increases large bidders' profits but proves unprofitable for small bidders, and pricing accuracy is increasing in the rate of information acquisition.
Auction Theory
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Author : Vijay Krishna
language : en
Publisher: Academic Press
Release Date : 2009-09-28
Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and has been published by Academic Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-09-28 with Business & Economics categories.
Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Market Power And Information Effects In A Multi Unit Auction
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Author : Andreas Hefti
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Market Power And Information Effects In A Multi Unit Auction written by Andreas Hefti and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
We study the effects of different information structures (full information, supply uncertainty and demand uncertainty) on equilibrium prices, allocative efficiency and bidding behavior in a (supply-side) uniform-price multi-unit auction, using supply function competition and a novel experimental design. Our setup integrates different types of market power and a varying level of competition. We empirically find that average prices tend to be higher under full information compared to the cases where bidders either have limited information about about the demand level or rivals' technologies or; the latter even leading to strictly lower average prices as the exertion of market power and bid shading is strongly reduced. We explain this finding with a behavioral equilibrium concept, where bidders behave as if competing against the average market situation. Further, we address the problem of multiplicity of equilibria by exploiting the equilibrium conditions to obtain an empirical selection of the average equilibrium supply function. The respective predictions of the average prices exceed those by standard OLS in all information treatments.