Bidding Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions
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Bidding Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions
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Author : Dirk Engelmann
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Bidding Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions written by Dirk Engelmann and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.
We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with at demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.
Bidder Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions Evidence From Swedish Treasury Auctions
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Author : Kjell G. Nyborg
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Bidder Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions Evidence From Swedish Treasury Auctions written by Kjell G. Nyborg and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second, we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner's curse-driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies. Third, we explore the extent to which the received theories of multiunit auctions are able to offer insights into the bidder behavior we observe. Our empirical evidence is consistent with some of the predictions of the models of auctions that emphasize private information, the winner's curse, and the champion's plague. While the models of multiunit auctions serve as useful guideposts, our empirical findings also point to several new areas of research in multiunit auctions that are of policy and theoretical interest.
Characterization Of Bidding Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions And Applications
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Author : Luciano I. de Castro Filho
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Characterization Of Bidding Behavior In Multi Unit Auctions And Applications written by Luciano I. de Castro Filho and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Bidding Behaviour In Multi Unit Auctions
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Author : Rebecca Catherine Elskamp
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Bidding Behaviour In Multi Unit Auctions written by Rebecca Catherine Elskamp and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
This thesis contains three essays on the topic of bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions. The first essay develops and experimentally tests multi-unit auction theory to identify the effects of "scaling up" multi-unit auction environments on individual bidding behaviour. A uniquely tractable environment is developed that leads to the construction of uniform auctions of different scales, where the prediction is that risk neutral bidders' bids on the last unit they demand are independent of scale. Two main effects were observed in the experimental data. Regardless of scale, bidders were found to bid more aggressively than predicted by the theory. Secondly, small scale effects were observed, as bids were more aggressive in the small scale relative to the larger scale treatment. The theoretical consequences of risk aversion, joy of winning, and anticipated regret are analyzed to explain these deviations from predictions. The second essay provides empirical evidence on how economic agents converge to optimality. Learning direction theory is applied to bidding behaviour from the Ontario dairy quota auction, following a change in pricing rule from uniform to discriminatory. Two dimensions of bidding behaviour are examined at the individual bidder level, bid prices and number of price-quantity bid pairs. Adjustments in bidding behaviour are broadly consistent with the ex-post rationality. Experience acquired under the discriminatory pricing rule is found to have diminishing effects on adjustments made to bidding behaviour, consistent with bidders converging towards optimality. The third essay examines the effect of two simultaneous policy changes, implemented in the Ontario dairy quota auction, to determine whether these changes were successful in achieving performance goals. Results of a series of regression models indicate that these two policy changes had no effect on clearing prices. Rather, these two policy changes were found to significantly reduce revenue from quantity purchased, total quantity transferred and total quantity offered. The combination of a significant reduction in bid prices and individual quantity demanded, paralleled by an increase in individual quantity offered appears to have been the underlying mechanisms, in terms of individual bidding/offering behaviour, through which the these two policies failed to meet performance goals.
Strategic Bidding In A Multi Unit Auction
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Author : Catherine D. Wolfram
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997
Strategic Bidding In A Multi Unit Auction written by Catherine D. Wolfram and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with Auctions categories.
This paper considers the bidding behavior of participants in the daily auction to supply electricity in England and Wales. Every day, owners of generating capacity submit bids reflecting a price for power from their plants. The price bid by the last plant used to meet electricity needs in a given time period is the price paid for capacity from all plants. Theoretical work on uniform-price multi-unit auctions suggests that bidders selling more than one unit of a good have an incentive to increase the prices they bid at high quantities. If a bid sets the equilibrium price, the bidder receives a higher price for that unit as well as for all inframarginal units. I find evidence of strategic bid increases. First, plants that are likely to be used after a number of other plants are already operating bid more. Second, the larger supplier submits higher bids, all else equal. Lastly, there is some evidence that bids for given plants are higher when the suppliers have more available capacity.
Two Essays On Bidding In Multi Unit Common Value Auctions
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Author : Minjie Shao
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Two Essays On Bidding In Multi Unit Common Value Auctions written by Minjie Shao and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with Auctions categories.
This dissertation consists of two essays on the topic of bidding in multi-unit common value auction. Essay one examines the role of capacity constraint on the auction results and bidding behavior. We consider a general case where bidders are unconstrained, and a second setting where bidders are capacity constrained. We document downward sloping demand curves for individual bidders. Bidders shade their bids by submitting quantity-price pairs and spreading their bids. The winner's curse is strong in the unconstrained treatment, but we find no evidence of the winner's curse when bidding constraints are imposed. Unconstrained bidders shade bids significantly more and their quantity-weighted prices are much lower than those in the constrained treatment. Interacting with the information structure, the capacity constraint has a significant impact on the auction results including the market clearing price, market efficiency, and the degree of market concentration. We provide evidence that efficient price discovery in multi-unit auctions with diverse information is possible, but careful attention to auction design will make this outcome more likely. Essay two examines how the introduction of a noncompetitive bidding option affects outcomes in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The experimental design incorporates many of the characteristics of the markets that pertain to the issuance of new equity securities. Important features of the bidding environment include endogenous bidder entry, costly information acquisition, bidders that differ by capacity constraint, and substantial uncertainty with respect to the intrinsic value. We use a standard uniform-price auction as our baseline setting where only competitive bids are accepted. Our results show that introducing the noncompetitive bidding option improves auction performance by increasing revenue and reducing price error. Underpricing is found in both treatments, but is less severe in the presence of the noncompetitive bidding option. The incorporation of this option significantly increases both the small bidder participation rate and allocation, and reduces the incentive for small bidders to free ride by submitting extremely high bids. Under both treatments, information acquisition increases large bidders' profits but proves unprofitable for small bidders, and pricing accuracy is increasing in the rate of information acquisition.
Strategic Bidding In Multi Unit Auctions With Capacity Constrained Bidders
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Author : Sebastian Schwenen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Strategic Bidding In Multi Unit Auctions With Capacity Constrained Bidders written by Sebastian Schwenen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
Demand Reduction In Multi Unit Auctions With Varying Numbers Of Bidders
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Author : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
Demand Reduction In Multi Unit Auctions With Varying Numbers Of Bidders written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.
Recent auction theory and experimental results document strategic demand reduction by bidders in uniform-price auctions. The present article extends this area of research to consider the effects of varying the number of bidders. Our theoretical model predicts that demand reduction should decrease with an increase in the number of bidders. Considerable demand reduction remains even in the asymptotic limit, although truthful bidding yields profits very close to those of equilibrium play. We experimentally confirm several of our predictions by examining bidding behavior of subjects in an actual marketplace, auctioning dozens of sportscards using both uniform-price and Vickrey auction formats.
Bidder Behavior In Multi Unit Ascending Auctions
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Author : Laurent Lamy
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Bidder Behavior In Multi Unit Ascending Auctions written by Laurent Lamy and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Bidder Behavior In Multiple Unit Auctions
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Author : Kjell G. Nyborg
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997
Bidder Behavior In Multiple Unit Auctions written by Kjell G. Nyborg and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with Government securities categories.