Companions In Guilt Arguments In Metaethics


Companions In Guilt Arguments In Metaethics
DOWNLOAD eBooks

Download Companions In Guilt Arguments In Metaethics PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Companions In Guilt Arguments In Metaethics book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page





Companions In Guilt Arguments In Metaethics


Companions In Guilt Arguments In Metaethics
DOWNLOAD eBooks

Author : Christopher Cowie
language : en
Publisher: Routledge
Release Date : 2019-09-24

Companions In Guilt Arguments In Metaethics written by Christopher Cowie and has been published by Routledge this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-09-24 with Philosophy categories.


Comparisons between morality and other ‘companion’ disciplines – such as mathematics, religion, or aesthetics – are commonly used in philosophy, often in the context of arguing for the objectivity of morality. This is known as the ‘companions in guilt’ strategy. It has been the subject of much debate in contemporary ethics and metaethics. This volume, the first full length examination of companions in guilt arguments, comprises an introduction by the editors and a dozen new chapters by leading authors in the field. They examine the methodology of companions in guilt arguments and their use in responding to the moral error theory, as well as specific arguments that take mathematics, epistemic norms, or aesthetics as a ‘companion’, and the use of the companions in guilt strategy to vindicate claims to moral knowledge. Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics is essential reading for advanced students and researchers working in moral theory and metaethics, as well as those in epistemology and philosophy of mathematics concerned with the intersection of these subjects with ethics.



Companions In Guilt


Companions In Guilt
DOWNLOAD eBooks

Author : H. Lillehammer
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2007-05-22

Companions In Guilt written by H. Lillehammer and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007-05-22 with Philosophy categories.


This is a systematic study of 'companions in guilt' arguments in moral philosophy. Lillehammer distinguishes between two distinct forms of these, which he calls 'arguments by entailment' and 'arguments by analogy' respectively. For each strategy, Lillehammer examines three of its most prominent manifestations in contemporary ethical thought.



Moral Error Theory


Moral Error Theory
DOWNLOAD eBooks

Author : Jonas Olson
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2014

Moral Error Theory written by Jonas Olson and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with Philosophy categories.


Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.



The Normative Web


The Normative Web
DOWNLOAD eBooks

Author : Terence Cuneo
language : en
Publisher: Clarendon Press
Release Date : 2010-03-04

The Normative Web written by Terence Cuneo and has been published by Clarendon Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-03-04 with Philosophy categories.


Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Do these views imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic ones, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. In so arguing, Cuneo provides not simply a defense of moral realism, but a positive argument for it. Moreover, this argument engages with a wide range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons. If the central argument of The Normative Web is correct, antirealist positions of these varieties come at a very high cost. Given their cost, Cuneo contends, we should find realism about both epistemic and moral facts highly attractive.



Morality And Mathematics


Morality And Mathematics
DOWNLOAD eBooks

Author : Justin Clarke-Doane
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2020-03-12

Morality And Mathematics written by Justin Clarke-Doane and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020-03-12 with Philosophy categories.


To what extent are the subjects of our thoughts and talk real? This is the question of realism. In this book, Justin Clarke-Doane explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. He argues that, contrary to widespread belief, our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified than our moral beliefs. It is also incorrect that reflection on the genealogy of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral antirealist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical antirealist as well. And, yet, Clarke-Doane shows that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together — and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense that mathematical questions are not, and the sense in which they are objective can only be explained by assuming practical anti-realism. One upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. Another is that the objective questions in the neighborhood of factual areas like logic, modality, grounding, and nature are practical questions too. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage.



Moral Realism


Moral Realism
DOWNLOAD eBooks

Author : Russ Shafer-Landau
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press on Demand
Release Date : 2005

Moral Realism written by Russ Shafer-Landau and has been published by Oxford University Press on Demand this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Philosophy categories.


Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. In the tradition of Plato and G. E. Moore, Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. These principles are a fundamental aspect of reality, just as much as those that govern mathematics or the natural world. They may be true regardless of our ability to grasp them, and their truth is not a matter of theirbeing ratified from any ideal standpoint, nor of being the object of actual or hypothetical consensus, nor of being an expression of our rational nature. Shafer-Landau accepts Plato's and Moore's contention that moral truths are sui generis. He rejects the currently popular efforts to conceive of ethics as a kind of science, and insists that moral truths and properties occupy a distinctive area in our ontology. Unlike scientific truths, the fundamental moral principles are knowable a priori. And unlike mathematical truths, they are essentially normative: intrinsically action-guiding, and supplying a justification for all who follow their counsel. Moral Realism is the first comprehensive treatise defending non-naturalistic moral realism in over a generation. It ranges over all of the central issues in contemporary metaethics, and will be an important source of discussion for philosophers and their students interested in issues concerning the foundations of ethics.



Moral Disagreement


Moral Disagreement
DOWNLOAD eBooks

Author : Rach Cosker-Rowland
language : en
Publisher: Routledge
Release Date : 2020-11-25

Moral Disagreement written by Rach Cosker-Rowland and has been published by Routledge this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020-11-25 with Philosophy categories.


Widespread moral disagreement raises ethical, epistemological, political, and metaethical questions. Is the best explanation of our widespread moral disagreements that there are no objective moral facts and that moral relativism is correct? Or should we think that just as there is widespread disagreement about whether we have free will but there is still an objective fact about whether we have it, similarly, moral disagreement has no bearing on whether morality is objective? More practically, is it arrogant to stick to our guns in the face of moral disagreement? Must we suspend belief about the morality of controversial actions such as eating meat and having an abortion? And does moral disagreement affect the laws that we should have? For instance, does disagreement about the justice of heavily redistributive taxation affect whether such taxation is legitimate? In this thorough and clearly written introduction to moral disagreement and its philosophical and practical implications, Rach Cosker-Rowland examines and assesses the following topics and questions: How does moral disagreement affect what we should do and believe in our day-to-day lives? Epistemic peerhood and moral disagreements with our epistemic peers Metaethics and moral disagreement Relativism, moral objectivity, moral realism, and non-cognitivism Moral disagreement and normative ethics Liberalism, democracy, and disagreement Moral compromise Moral uncertainty. Combining clear philosophical analysis with summaries of the latest research and suggestions for further reading, Moral Disagreement is ideal for students of ethics, metaethics, political philosophy, and philosophical topics that are closely related such as relativism and scepticism. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as ethics and public policy and philosophy of law.



Practical Tortoise Raising


Practical Tortoise Raising
DOWNLOAD eBooks

Author : Simon Blackburn
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2010-09-30

Practical Tortoise Raising written by Simon Blackburn and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-09-30 with Language Arts & Disciplines categories.


Simon Blackburn presents a selection of his philosophical essays from 1995 to 2010. He offers engaging and illuminating discussions of a wide range of topics, including moral philosophy, the theory of meaning, pragmatism, and the theory of reason and reasoning.



The Repugnant Conclusion


The Repugnant Conclusion
DOWNLOAD eBooks

Author : Christopher Cowie
language : en
Publisher: Routledge
Release Date : 2019-11-18

The Repugnant Conclusion written by Christopher Cowie and has been published by Routledge this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-11-18 with Business & Economics categories.


The Repugnant Conclusion is a controversial theorem about population size. It states that a sufficiently large population of lives that are barely worth living is better than a smaller population of high quality lives. This is highly counter-intuitive. It implies that we can improve the world by trading quality of life for quantity of lives. Can it be defended? Christopher Cowie explores these questions and unpacks the controversies surrounding the Repugnant Conclusion. He focuses on whether the truth of the Repugnant Conclusion turns - as some have claimed - on the uncomfortable claim that many people’s lives are actually bad for them and that even privileged people lead lives that are only just worth living. Highly recommended for those interested in ethics, applied ethics and population studies The Repugnant Conclusion will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as economics, development studies, politics and international relations.



Unbelievable Errors


Unbelievable Errors
DOWNLOAD eBooks

Author : Bart Streumer
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2017-08-04

Unbelievable Errors written by Bart Streumer and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-08-04 with Philosophy categories.


Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory. But he argues that it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory and it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory. He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it.