Determinants Of Chief Executive Officer Compensation Evidence From The U K Finance And Property And Other Services Sectors
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Determinants Of Chief Executive Officer Compensation Evidence From The U K Finance And Property And Other Services Sectors
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Author : Xunjin Du
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2001
Determinants Of Chief Executive Officer Compensation Evidence From The U K Finance And Property And Other Services Sectors written by Xunjin Du and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with categories.
Determinants Of Ceo Remuneration For Jse Listed Financial Service Organisations
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Author : Wayne Ramgath
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020
Determinants Of Ceo Remuneration For Jse Listed Financial Service Organisations written by Wayne Ramgath and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.
Research Background: Years of academic research has resulted in an inconclusive view on which factors determine a CEOs remuneration. As such, the quantum of the wage premium paid to CEOs, relative to employees at all other levels, has been a contentious topic that has been discussed for decades, with research on the topic dating back to the 1980s. In the late 2000s, the topic resurfaced in the media, after CEOs of multinational corporations had been linked to the outcomes of various scandals. And evidence showed that there was a positive link between the risky actions taken by CEOs, incentivised by their remuneration structure, which contributed to the financial crisis of 2008. Research Purpose and Design: The purpose of this study was to determine whether organisation size and organisation performance were determinants of CEO remuneration, and to what degree. The study focussed on JSE listed organisations in the financial services sector. And the sample was made up of the top 15 organisations, based on their market capitalisation. Data was collected over a five-year period, spanning 2015-2019. Main Findings: The main findings of this research indicate that organisation size is not a significant determinant of CEO remuneration, for financial services organisations, listed on the JSE. In contrast, organisation performance was found to be a significant determinant of CEO remuneration. These findings add to the body of knowledge on this topic and create an evidence base, showing that the remuneration packages set by these organisations, are performance driven.
The Role And Effect Of Corporate Governance And Remuneration Consultants On Ceo Compensation
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Author : Saleh Ali F. Alagla
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
The Role And Effect Of Corporate Governance And Remuneration Consultants On Ceo Compensation written by Saleh Ali F. Alagla and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
This thesis investigates the role and effect of different aspects of corporate governance, ownership structure and remuneration consultants on determining the level and the structure of CEO compensation. The main objective of this research is to better understand the impact of these aspects on compensation of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in UK firms. Two models are constructed and a set of hypotheses is developed. These models are tested using a sample consisting of the top 350 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. Firms in the financial, investment and insurance industries are excluded due to the different nature of their accounting, governance, and compensation practices. The study covers the period of five financial years (2004-2008). Twenty-two hypotheses are derived from both models. These hypotheses are tested using multivariate techniques in order to determine to what extent corporate governance, ownership and remuneration consultants' attributes play a role in monitoring managers and setting appropriate CEO compensation. Using a sample of 237 non-financial FTSE 350 firms during 2004-2008 (i.e. 851 firm-year observations), and after controlling for the standard economic and human capital determinants of compensation, this study finds that corporate governance, ownership and remuneration consultants' characteristics play an important role in determining CEO compensation. However, the findings do not suggest that these attributes always play a positive role in constraining opportunistic managerial behaviour. Surprisingly, some of the governance attributes have been found to facilitate the executives' needs rather than to attempt to monitor them. The findings of the thesis suggest that a number of theoretical perspectives can be used to explain the relationship between corporate governance, remuneration consultants and CEO compensation in the UK firms. For example, while the findings of board independence and CEO duality provide strong support to the stewardship theory, as firms enjoy better compensation governance when their boards contain more executive directors and are chaired by CEOs, the results of chairman independence and ownership, and remuneration committee independence, are found to be in line with both agency theory and the alignment of interests' hypothesis of agency theory since we find these variables play a strong role in mitigating the agency problems and agency costs through setting appropriate CEO compensation. Conversely, the managerial power perspective receives great support from the findings of a number of governance, ownership, and consultants' variables. That is, the analysis concludes that larger boards, well-compensated board and remuneration committee non-executive directors, CEOs with greater share ownership, CEOs sitting on the remuneration committee, less independent remuneration consultants, and the switch of remuneration consultants all play significant roles in increasing the level of CEO compensation and setting inappropriate designs for remuneration that are more favourable to the CEO (i.e. more fixed and less equity-based compensation). Overall, the findings of this thesis imply that shareholders, regulators, and practitioners should be concerned about the composition and the characteristics of a firm's board of directors, remuneration committee, and external directors who comprise the firm's internal control structure as this research finds that the quality of corporate and compensation governance varies depending on board and remuneration committee size and characteristics. Furthermore, it is advised that the relevant parties should pay attention to the remuneration consultants' independence status and characteristics since this study finds that independent, specialized, and larger remuneration consultants play a significant role in enhancing the quality of compensation arrangements. Therefore, this study offers new insights over the effect that corporate governance and remuneration consultants can exert over the design of CEO compensation contracts.
Executive Compensation Capital Structure Payouts And Cash Holdings
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Author : Adilah Azhari
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Executive Compensation Capital Structure Payouts And Cash Holdings written by Adilah Azhari and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
The aim of this research is to examine the relationship between CEO pay and firm's financial policies. According to agency theory, manager-shareholder conflicts of interest can be alleviated (and managerial compensation can be influenced) by debt. Debt lowers the level of free cash flow which managers are able to obtain because monitoring increases. This means that when the risk of bankruptcy appears, managers must consider the best financial interests of shareholders. Under agency theory, pay-performance sensitivity is smaller for high-debt companies when alternatives are available for high alignment incentives and high debt. The research objectives focus on three empirical chapters to explore the association between CEO pay and firm's financial policies for UK firms. The first study investigates the relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and debt as the explanatory variables. In the second study, the link between CEO compensation and corporate payout policy by segregating between total payouts, dividends and share repurchases are explored. Finally, the last objective examines the interaction between CEO pay packages and cash holdings of the firm. The research sample consists of 183 publicly traded companies listed on the FTSE 350 from 1999 to 2008. The estimates in the pay-performance study show mixed support for pay-performance and leverage because the negative coefficients for market debt have weak significance overall when median regressions are employed. Thus, it can be concluded that a firm's leverage has little effect on pay-performance sensitivity as a mechanism to align the interests of the firm's CEO and debt holders. However, there is strong support for the hypothesis that CEO pay-performance sensitivity increases with a firm's growth opportunities, which suggests that firms award higher equity compensation to attract managers with more talent. The second study in this research investigates how corporate payout policy is influenced by CEO share ownership, CEO stock options and CEO long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) in UK firms from 1999 to 2008 using Tobit regressions (for total payouts, dividends and share repurchases) and logistic regressions for the propensity of firms paying out to shareholders. The results show that CEO share ownership LTIPs have positive effects on corporate payout policy. In contrast, corporate governance characteristics do not show conclusive results which affect changes in payout policy. Dividend payout is significantly influenced by CEO share ownership compared to share repurchase payout. The findings support the notion that CEOs' share equity ownership is used to align managerial interest with shareholders in terms of cash payouts to shareholders. In the final empirical chapter, the study focuses on the effect of CEO pay and corporate governance on cash holdings. The study investigates the determinants of cash holdings based on free cash flow and the agency model using cash ratios (cash to sales, cash to assets, cash to market value and log of cash) as dependent variables. The analysis documents that CEO ownership and log LTIPs both have positive and strong relationships with cash ratios. The results support the hypothesis that equity compensation can be used to align managers' interests with those of shareholders.
Determinants Of Chief Executive Officer Compensation
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Author : Hwei Cheng Wang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Determinants Of Chief Executive Officer Compensation written by Hwei Cheng Wang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
This study examines the level and structure of CEO compensation of 2,448 CEO's from 1,622 firms spanning a range extending from 1997 through 2002. Based on agency and expectancy theories, this study tests the hypotheses that corporate diversification is associated with CEO compensation. The results found that the higher degree of international diversification, higher accounting earning performance, higher investment opportunities, and larger firm size, resulted in CEO's receiving higher levels of compensation. In contrast, the higher the degree of industrial diversification, the fewer levels of total compensation, long-term compensation, and stock options corporate CEO's received. In addition, this study finds that both international and industrial diversification is associated with a greater use of current compensation, as well as a greater reliance on accounting-based, rather than stock return earning (market-based measures) of firm performance.
Determinants Of Executive Compensation
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Author : Ellen Pavlik
language : en
Publisher: Praeger
Release Date : 1991-06-21
Determinants Of Executive Compensation written by Ellen Pavlik and has been published by Praeger this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1991-06-21 with Business & Economics categories.
This book is a thorough study of what determines executive compensation levels, challenging prior research which tended to focus solely on the influence of corporate financial performance.
The Handbook Of The Economics Of Corporate Governance
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Author : Benjamin Hermalin
language : en
Publisher: Elsevier
Release Date : 2017-09-18
The Handbook Of The Economics Of Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Hermalin and has been published by Elsevier this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-09-18 with Business & Economics categories.
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
Ceo Compensation
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Author : Alex Edmans
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
Ceo Compensation written by Alex Edmans and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with Corporate governance categories.
We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy on CEO pay, implying they face significant constraints other than participation and incentive compatibility. These constraints lead to lower pay levels and more one-size-fits-all structures. Shareholders are the main source of constraints, suggesting directors and investors disagree on how to maximize value. Respondents view intrinsic motivation and reputation as stronger motivators than incentive pay. They believe pay matters to CEOs not to finance consumption, but because it affects perceptions of fairness. The need to fairly recognize the CEO's contribution explains why flow pay responds to performance, even though CEOs' equity holdings already provide substantial consumption incentives, and why peer firm pay matters beyond retention concerns. Fairness also matters to investors, with shareholder returns an important reference point. This causes CEO pay to be affected by external risks, in contrast to optimal risk sharing.
Pay Without Performance
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Author : Lucian A. Bebchuk
language : en
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Release Date : 2004
Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and has been published by Harvard University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with Business & Economics categories.
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Executive Compensation And Shareholder Value
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Author : Jennifer Carpenter
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2013-04-17
Executive Compensation And Shareholder Value written by Jennifer Carpenter and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-04-17 with Business & Economics categories.
Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.