Essays On Mechanism Design Without Transfers

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Essays On Mechanism Design Without Transfers

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Author : Ethem Akyol
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014

Essays On Mechanism Design Without Transfers written by Ethem Akyol and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.

This dissertation consists of three chapters.In Chapter 1, we compare two widely used allocation methods for school choice, the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism and the Boston mechanism, in terms of welfare. We consider a symmetric incomplete information setting in which students have independently drawn valuations for schools and all schools have an identical ranking of the students. Our main result is that when each school has one available seat and the number of schools and students is large, every type of every student has a higher interim utility under the Boston mechanism than under the DA mechanism. Although this strong result is not true when the number of schools is small, even in this case, the Boston mechanism is ex-ante welfare superior to DA under weak conditions on the distribution of valuations.In Chapter 2, we consider the problem of allocating n>=2 indivisible distinct objects (possibly with multiple copies of each) to m>=2 agents without monetary transfers. We assume that agents have private preferences and consider mechanisms that depend only on agents' reported ordinal preferences. Full efficiency cannot be achieved in this environment, and so we look for a welfare maximizing, incentive compatible mechanism. We show that when agents' rankings over objects are independent of other agents' rankings and each possible ranking is equally likely, the so-called Ranking mechanism (first-order) stochastically dominates any other anonymous, neutral and incentive compatible ordinal mechanism. In particular, when agents' preferences over random allocations are responsive, every type of every agent has a higher interim welfare under the Ranking mechanism.In Chapter 3, we consider the problem of allocating multiple objects to agents via an auction by using "points" as in the "Course Bidding System" that is used by several business schools. Each agent has a fixed amount of divisible points which can only be used for bidding and have no monetary value. Agents simultaneously bid for the objects, and each object is given to the agent who bids highest for that object. This game is equivalent to the classical "Colonel Blotto" game. We consider this game under incomplete information when agents have private values for the objects. For a class of value distributions, we solve for a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this game. Furthermore, for all the value distributions for which we can solve for equilibrium in closed form, we show that every type of agent has a higher interim payoff under this allocation method than any other incentive compatible allocation method that depends only on ordinal preferences.

Essays In Mechanism Design

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Author : Yunan Li
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017

Essays In Mechanism Design written by Yunan Li and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.

In this thesis, I study mechanism design problems in environments where the information necessary to make decisions is affected by the actions of principal or agents.The first chapter considers the problem of a principal who must allocate a good among a finite number of agents, each of whom values the good. Each agent has private information about the principal's payoff if he receives the good. There are no monetary transfers. The principal can inspect agents' reports at a cost and punish them, but punishments are limited because verification is imperfect or information arrives only after the good has been allocated for a while. I characterize an optimal mechanism featuring two thresholds. Agents whose values are below the lower threshold and above the upper threshold are pooled, respectively. If the number of agents is small, then the pooling area at the top of value distribution disappears. If the number of agents is large, then the two pooling areas meet and the optimal mechanism can be implemented via a shortlisting procedure. The fact that the optimal mechanism depends on the number of agents implies that small and large organizations should behave differently. The second chapter considers the problem of a principal who wishes to distribute an indivisible good to a population of budget-constrained agents. Both valuation and budget are an agent's private information. The principal can inspect an agent's budget through a costly verification process and punish an agent who makes a false statement. I characterize the direct surplus-maximizing mechanism. This direct mechanism can be implemented by a two-stage mechanism in which agents only report their budgets. Specifically, all agents report their budgets in the first stage. The principal then provides budget-dependent cash subsidies to agents and assigns the goods randomly (with uniform probability) at budget-dependent prices. In the second stage, a resale market opens, but is regulated with budget-dependent sales taxes. Agents who report low budgets receive more subsidies in their initial purchases (the first stage), face higher taxes in the resale market (the second stage) and are inspected randomly. This implementation exhibits some of the features of some welfare programs, such as Singapore's housing and development board.The third chapter studies the design of ex-ante efficient mechanisms in situations where a single item is for sale, and agents have positively interdependent values and can covertly acquire information at a cost before participating in a mechanism. I find that when interdependency is low or the number of agents is large, the ex-post efficient mechanism is also ex-ante efficient. In cases of high interdependency or a small number of agents, ex-ante efficient mechanisms discourage agents from acquiring excessive information by introducing randomization to the ex-post efficient allocation rule in areas where the information's precision increases most rapidly.

Essays In Mechanism Design

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Author : Levent Ulku
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008

Essays In Mechanism Design written by Levent Ulku and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with Econometrics categories.

This dissertation consists of three essays in the theory of mechanism design under incomplete information. In the first essay, we analyze an implementation problem in which monetary transfers are feasible, valuations are interdependent and the set of available choices lies in a product space of lattices. This framework is general enough to subsume many interesting examples, including allocation problems with multiple objects. We identify a class of social choice rules which can be implemented in ex post equilibrium. We identify conditions under which ex post efficient social choice rules are implementable using monotone selection theory. The key conditions are extensions of the single crossing property and supermodularity. These conditions can be replaced with more tractable conditions in multiobject allocation problems with either two objects or two agents. I also show that the payments which implement monotone social decision rules coincide with the payments of (1) the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with private values, and (2) the generalized Vickrey auction introduced by Ausubel [1999] in multiunit allocation problems. The second essay generalizes the analysis of optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism design for the seller of a single object introduced by Myerson [1981]. We consider a problem in which the seller has several heterogeneous objects and buyers' valuations depend on each other's private information. We analyze two nonnested environments in which incentive constraints can be replaced with more tractable monotonicity conditions. We establish conditions under which these monotonicity conditions can be ignored, and show that several earlier analyses of the optimal mechanism design problem can be unified and generalized. In particular, problems with two complementary goods in Levin [1997] and multiunit auction problems in Maskin and Riley [1989] and Branco [1996] are special cases. The third essay considers the problem of selling internet advertising slots to advertisers. Under suitable conditions, we solve for the payments imposed by an optimal mechanism and show that it can be decentralized via prices using a linear assignment approach. At every configuration of private information, optimal mechanism can be interpreted as a menu consisting of a price for every slot.

Three Essays In Public Mechanism Design

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Author : Jin Kim
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Three Essays In Public Mechanism Design written by Jin Kim and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.

Essays In Mechanism Design

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Author : Alia Gizatulina
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009

Essays In Mechanism Design written by Alia Gizatulina and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.

Essays In Mechanism Design

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Author : Frank Rosar
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007

Essays In Mechanism Design written by Frank Rosar and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.

Essays On Mechanism Design

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Author : Douglas Scott Smith
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011

Essays On Mechanism Design written by Douglas Scott Smith and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.

Essays In Mechanism Design

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Author : Abhishek Bapna
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006

Essays In Mechanism Design written by Abhishek Bapna and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.

This thesis is about two contributions to the theory of mechanism design and one application of this theory to the banking industry.

Essays On Dynamic Mechanism Design

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Author : Heng Liu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015

Essays On Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Heng Liu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Commercial treaties categories.

This dissertation is a collection of two papers studying both the theoretical and the applied aspects of dynamic mechanism design. In Chapter 1, we address the problem of implementing socially efficient allocations in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. In the case where the agents' information is correlated across time, we construct efficient and incentive compatible direct dynamic mechanisms. Unlike the mechanisms with history-independent transfers in the existing literature, these mechanisms feature history-dependent transfers. Moreover, they are reminiscent of the classical VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism, even though the latter is not incentive compatible with interdependent valuations. In settings where agents' private information evolves independently, we construct the dynamic counterpart of the generalized VCG mechanism in one-dimensional environments. In Chapter 2, we study the problem of designing efficient trade agreements when countries involved in trade can use "disguised protections" in the form of domestic policies. We take a dynamic mechanism design approach to examine the interaction between trade and domestic policies. In particular, we show that allowing countries to make transfers can solve the incentive problems associated with private information. However, due to lack of commitment, these transfers may or may not be self-enforcing, depending on the persistence countries' private information. Our results indicate the possibility for WTO to improve the existing trade agreements through financial transfers.

Essays In Mechanism Design

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Author : Daniele Condorelli
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010

Essays In Mechanism Design written by Daniele Condorelli and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.