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Essays On Uncertainty And Escape In Trade Agreements


Essays On Uncertainty And Escape In Trade Agreements
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Essays On Uncertainty And Escape In Trade Agreements


Essays On Uncertainty And Escape In Trade Agreements
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Author : Mathias Herzing
language : sv
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005

Essays On Uncertainty And Escape In Trade Agreements written by Mathias Herzing and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.




Essays On Preferential Trade Agreements Under Uncertainty


Essays On Preferential Trade Agreements Under Uncertainty
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Author : Shafkat Ali
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016

Essays On Preferential Trade Agreements Under Uncertainty written by Shafkat Ali and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.


This dissertation studies the formation of preferential trade agreements using a coalition formation approach in both certain and uncertain frameworks. It is at the intersection of international trade and cooperative game theory. In chapter 2 we consider a three-country model of oligopoly and trade under demand uncertainty. We endogenize the coalition structure that forms in a three stage game. We find that for small volatilities countries prefer global free trade. The more positively correlated two countries are the more likely they are to form a customs union. We also find that countries may wish to stand alone under certain variance-covariance configurations. In chapter 3 we add exogenous trade costs under both certainty and uncertainty. We find that trade costs critically affect choice of output by firms and choice of tariffs and coalitions by governments. With symmetric trade costs as trade costs vary we find different coalitions forming in equilibrium. The introduction of demand uncertainty affects coalition choices by changing the cutoff trade costs at which a country may be indifferent between two different coalitions. Further, coalitions that may form under certainty or low uncertainty may not form with high uncertainty. On the other hand under different configuration of trade costs coalitions that may not be feasible under certainty may be shown to be possible under uncertainty. In both cases, as long as trade costs are not prohibitive, as volatility in every market increases without bound, we get global free trade with probability one. As a special case we show that under certain conditions two geographically distant countries may choose to form a coalition excluding a nearby country if the market volatility and correlation between partner countries is high enough. .



From Here To Free Trade


From Here To Free Trade
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Author : Ernest H. Preeg
language : en
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Release Date : 1998-05-13

From Here To Free Trade written by Ernest H. Preeg and has been published by University of Chicago Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998-05-13 with Business & Economics categories.


In his new book, Ernest Preeg analyzes international trade and investment in the 1990s and lays out a comprehensive U.S. trade strategy for the uncertain period ahead. He examines the influence of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and argues that economic globalization is beneficial to the U.S. economy in the short- to medium-term while raising important questions about national sovereignty and security over the longer term. Preeg believes regional free trade agreements will soon encompass the majority of world trade, but they can conflict with the WTO's multilateral objectives. The central challenge for U.S. trade strategy, then, is to integrate the now largely separate multilateral and regional tracks of the world trading system. The first essay assesses U.S. interests in economic globalization, the second examines recent steps toward free trade at the multilateral and regional levels, and the next three offer an in-depth critique of U.S. regional free trade objectives in the Americas, across the Pacific, and possibly with Europe. The final essay presents a multilateral/regional synthesis for going from here to free trade over the coming decade.



Essays On International Trade Negotiations


Essays On International Trade Negotiations
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Author : Patricia Anne Mueller
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019

Essays On International Trade Negotiations written by Patricia Anne Mueller and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.


Chapter 1: I examine the welfare benefit of committing to a trade agreement when a politically-motivated government faces monopolistically competitive firms lobbying for tariff protection against imports. In my model, lobbying is costly to producers: each firm must pay a portion of the industry's upfront-lobby-formation fee as determined by a sequential bargaining game. I show that monopolistically competitive producers under-hire capital to avoid paying a larger share of lobbying costs. As a result, more varieties are produced than is socially optimal, and each firm operates at a higher-than-optimal marginal cost. Commitment to a trade agreement leads to a consolidation of firms in the market and a reduction in the tariff level. I show that a government benefits from committing to a trade agreement (i) on goods with very elastic or very inelastic demand, (ii) when the weight the government places on receiving political contributions from lobbyists is small, and (iii) when producers are strong bargainers and are able to capture the majority of the rents from protection. Chapter 2: In a model in which a small-country government faces domestic political-economy pressure and uncertainty over its terms of trade, a welfare-maximizing government benefits from having access to both rigid and flexible tariff policy options. I show that a welfare-maximizing government may prefer to join both a deep-integration regional trade agreement (helping it commit to free trade with key trading partners, thus correcting production distortions resulting from rent-seeking by politically organized sectors), and a large flexible agreement like the World Trade Organization (providing the flexibility in tariff levels and the institutional structure to pursue temporary tariff protection in response to shocks or unfair trade practices). My paper builds on the framework of Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998), adding uncertainty over world prices and adding the option to join a trade agreement with the flexibility of a temporary escape clause.



Essays On International Trade Agreements And Contracts Under Renegotiation


Essays On International Trade Agreements And Contracts Under Renegotiation
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Author : Kristina L. Buzard
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012

Essays On International Trade Agreements And Contracts Under Renegotiation written by Kristina L. Buzard and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with Commercial policy categories.


The first chapter of the dissertation addresses general issues in contracting with external enforcement. We study a contracting environment with specific investments in which renegotiation, and therefore hold-up, is possible. We show that taking account of the precise nature of trading and investment technologies is important for accurately determining the trading relationships in which efficient investment and trade will occur and that careful modeling of institutional detail and the information available to private parties and the external enforcement body (e.g. a court) are key. The second chapter presents a model of international trade agreements in which domestic policy-making power is shared between executive and legislative branches of government. Acknowledging the complexity of the legislative process as well as its susceptibility to lobbying reveals a political commitment role for trade agreements in that executives can use them to reduce incentives for lobbying so that the legislatures can better withstand political pressure. This helps explain the result from tests of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model that there is too much protection relative to contributions given estimates of governments' social-welfare weights : I predict that contribution levels may in fact be low because tariffs have been raised to prevent political pressure and the increased risk of a trade disruption it engenders. The third chapter extends this model to a repeated-game framework, replacing the assumption of external enforcement with self-enforcing promises of future cooperation. Here, the inability of actors to make commitments affects the design of trade agreements in two ways: executives must not only take into account the legislatures' lobbying-driven propensity to revoke delegation and break the agreement, but also be robust to the executives' own incentives to renegotiate out of any punishment scheme. The design of the dispute resolution mechanism that makes the optimal punishment incentive compatible must balance two, often-conflicting, objectives: longer punishment periods help to enforce cooperation by increasing the costs of defecting from the agreement, but because the lobbies prefer the punishment outcome, this also incentivizes lobbying effort and with it the political pressure to break the agreement. Thus the model generates new predictions for the optimal design of mechanisms for resolving the disputes that arise in the course of trade-agreement relationships.



Two Essays On Trade Agreements


Two Essays On Trade Agreements
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Author : Liming Huang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013

Two Essays On Trade Agreements written by Liming Huang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with Economics categories.


In the first chapter we study the consequences of regional free trade agreements (FTAs) for global free trade. In the context of a three-country, two-good general equilibrium trade model, we derive stable Nash equilibria of two coalition formation games of trade liberalization: One in which FTAs are ruled out, and another in which countries have the option to form FTAs. Our analysis reveals that there exist circumstances under which the option to form FTAs may facilitate the attainment of global free trade ("building blocks"). However, there also exist circumstances under which FTAs stand in the way of global free trade ("stumbling blocks"). Two important determinants of these possibilities are relative country size and the structure of comparative advantage. In the second chapter we examine the effect of the formation of FTAs on non-FTA countries' tariffs using detailed data on tariffs and trade flows for the US, Mexico, and China from 1992 to 1997. We find that an increase in an FTA member's tariff discrimination against a non-member leads to a reduction in the non-member's tariffs. We also find that an increase in the non-member's size relative to its FTA-member competitor (which competes with the non-member because they have the same comparative advantage) causes a rise in its tariffs. The relative strength of the two effects, determines whether the FTA acts as a "building block'' or "stumbling block'' to a non-member's trade liberalization.



Three Essays In The Theory Of International Trade Under Uncertainty


Three Essays In The Theory Of International Trade Under Uncertainty
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Author : Timothy Leonard Fries
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1982

Three Essays In The Theory Of International Trade Under Uncertainty written by Timothy Leonard Fries and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1982 with Commerce categories.




The Oxford Handbook Of International Trade Law


The Oxford Handbook Of International Trade Law
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Author :
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2022-11-17

The Oxford Handbook Of International Trade Law written by and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022-11-17 with Political Science categories.


The rules and regulations governing international trade have grown at an exponential rate in the years since the Uruguay Round agreements established the WTO in 1995. These agreements continue to act as the multilateral foundation of the body of law, which is being expanded by its own committees and in new arrangements. As the international trade law system grows, it comes under increasing scrutiny from scholars, government officials, and trade law practitioners, it raises questions about the overlap with other international legal, political, and economic regimes. This Handbook considers the system of international trade law and what it means for States, for economic systems, for other international regimes, for civil society, and for human welfare. The book opens by focusing on the regulation of international trade, considering the history, economics, and sources of international trade law, as well as the possibilities for the future. It considers the intersection of international trade law with States, the economic and institutional context of the world trading system, the framework of its substantive law, and the balance of trade objectives versus ethical responsibilities. The book concludes by offering analysis of new trade law developments in the agricultural, digital, and financial sectors, as well as outlining the settlement of trade law disputes both in the WTO and bilateral/regional trade agreements. The second edition broadens the scope of analysis beyond the WTO, analysing regional trade agreements and preferential trade arrangements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Canada-EU Trade Agreement. The new edition also considers developments within the WTO such as in the area of agricultural export subsidies, and the Trade Facilitation Agreement.



Legal And Economic Principles Of World Trade Law


Legal And Economic Principles Of World Trade Law
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Author : Henrik Horn
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2013-04-22

Legal And Economic Principles Of World Trade Law written by Henrik Horn and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-04-22 with Business & Economics categories.


Reports work done thus far to identify improvements to the interpretation of the WTO Agreement based on a project led by the American Law Institute.



Trade Policy Flexibility And Enforcement In The Wto


Trade Policy Flexibility And Enforcement In The Wto
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Author : Simon A. B. Schropp
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2009-08-13

Trade Policy Flexibility And Enforcement In The Wto written by Simon A. B. Schropp and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-08-13 with Law categories.


The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an incomplete contract among sovereign countries. Trade policy flexibility mechanisms are designed to deal with contractual gaps, which are the inevitable consequence of this contractual incompleteness. Trade policy flexibility mechanisms are backed up by enforcement instruments which allow for punishment of illegal extra-contractual conduct. This book offers a legal and economic analysis of contractual escape and punishment in the WTO. It assesses the interrelation between contractual incompleteness, trade policy flexibility mechanisms, contract enforcement, and WTO Members' willingness to co-operate and to commit to trade liberalization. It contributes to the body of WTO scholarship by providing a systematic assessment of the weaknesses of the current regime of escape and punishment in the WTO, and the systemic implications that these weaknesses have for the international trading system, before offering a reform agenda that is concrete, politically realistic, and systemically viable.