Identification And Estimation In Highway Procurement Auctions Under Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity
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Identification And Estimation In Highway Procurement Auctions Under Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity
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Author : Elena Krasnokutskaya
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Identification And Estimation In Highway Procurement Auctions Under Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity written by Elena Krasnokutskaya and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.
This paper proposes a semi-parametric method to uncover the distribution of bidders' private information in the market for highway procurement when unobserved auction heterogeneity is present. I derive sufficient conditions under which the model is identified and show that the estimation procedure produces uniformly consistent estimators of the distributions in question. The estimation procedure is applied to data from Michigan highway procurement auctions. I estimate that 75% of the variation in bidders' costs may be attributed to the factors known to all bidders and only 25% may be generated by private information. My results suggest that failing to account for unobserved auction heterogeneity may lead to overestimating uncertainty that bidders face when submitting their bids. As a result both inefficiency of the auction mechanism and mark-ups over the bidders' costs may be overestimated.
Identification And Estimation In Highway Procurement Auctions Under Unobserved Heterogeneity
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Author : Elena Krasnokutskaya
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Identification And Estimation In Highway Procurement Auctions Under Unobserved Heterogeneity written by Elena Krasnokutskaya and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
Identification And Estimation Of Auction Model With Two Dimensional Unobserved Heterogeneity
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Author : Elena Krasnokutskaya
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Identification And Estimation Of Auction Model With Two Dimensional Unobserved Heterogeneity written by Elena Krasnokutskaya and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
This article investigates the empirical importance of allowing for multidimensional sources of unobserved heterogeneity in auction models with private information. It develops the estimation procedure to recover the distribution of private information in the presence of two sources of unobserved heterogeneity. It is shown that this estimation procedure identifies components of the model and produces uniformly consistent estimators of these components. The results of the estimation with highway procurement data indicate that allowing for two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity may significantly affect the results of estimation as well as policy-relevant instruments derived from the estimated distributions of bidders' costs.
Identification And Estimation Of Risk Aversion In First Price Auctions With Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity
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Author : Serafin Grundi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Identification And Estimation Of Risk Aversion In First Price Auctions With Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity written by Serafin Grundi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with Auctions categories.
This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models. If the exclusion restriction is violated, but weaker restrictions hold instead, the same identification strategy still yields valid bounds for the primitives. We propose a sieve maximum likelihood estimator. A series of Monte Carlo experiments illustrate that the estimator performs well in finite samples and that ignoring unobserved auction heterogeneity can lead to a significant bias in risk-aversion estimates. In an application to U.S. Forest Service timber auctions we find that the bidders are risk neutral, but we would reject risk neutrality without accounting for unobserved auction heterogeneity.
Essays On Structural Analysis Of Procurement Auctions
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Author : Bin Yu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Essays On Structural Analysis Of Procurement Auctions written by Bin Yu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
This dissertation addresses the empirical analysis of procurements based on the auction theory, which is known as the structural-form analysis of procurement auctions.
Identification And Estimation Of Risk Aversion In First Price Auctions With Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Identification And Estimation Of Risk Aversion In First Price Auctions With Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models. If the exclusion restriction is violated, but weaker restrictions hold instead, the same identification strategy still yields valid bounds for the primitives. We propose a sieve maximum likelihood estimator. A series of Monte Carlo experiments illustrate that the estimator performs well in finite samples and that ignoring unobserved auction heterogeneity can lead to a significant bias in risk-aversion estimates. In an application to U.S. Forest Service timber auctions we find that the bidders are risk neutral, but we would reject risk neutrality without accounting for unobserved auction heterogeneity.
Identification And Estimation Of Risk Aversion In First Price Auctions With Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity
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Author : Serafin Grundi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Identification And Estimation Of Risk Aversion In First Price Auctions With Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity written by Serafin Grundi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with Auctions categories.
This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models. If the exclusion restriction is violated, but weaker restrictions hold instead, the same identification strategy still yields valid bounds for the primitives. We propose a sieve maximum likelihood estimator. A series of Monte Carlo experiments illustrate that the estimator performs well in finite samples and that ignoring unobserved auction heterogeneity can lead to a significant bias in risk-aversion estimates. In an application to U.S. Forest Service timber auctions we find that the bidders are risk neutral, but we would reject risk neutrality without accounting for unobserved auction heterogeneity.
Essays On Empirical Auctions And Related Econometrics
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Essays On Empirical Auctions And Related Econometrics written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
The first chapter studies identification and estimation of first-price auctions if the bidders face ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Ambiguity is modeled using Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) Maxmin Expected Utility preferences. We exploit variation in the number of bidders to identify the essential primitives of the model. The identification result yields a closed form for the inverse bid function, which suggests a two-step estimation procedure. We study asymptotic and finite sample properties of the estimators. We find evidence of ambiguity in USFS timber auctions which leads to aggressive bidding for bidders with high valuations and has important implications for auction design. The second chapter proposes a procedure to test restrictions on infinite-dimensional parameters (partially) identified by unconditional or conditional moment equalities. Our new method allows us to test restrictions involving a continuum of inequalities. Examples of such restrictions include weakly increasing, concavity and first-order stochastic dominance. We show that our testing procedure controls size uniformly and has power approaching 1 against fixed alternatives. We conduct Monte Carlo Experiments to study the finite sample properties of our procedure. The third chapter studies the inference problem of bidders' risk attitudes in Independent Private Value (IPV) first-price auctions with multiplicative auction-level unobserved heterogeneity. Bidders are assumed to have Constant Relative Risk Aversion. Under the exclusion restriction that bidders randomly select themselves into auctions given the auction-level unobserved heterogeneity, bidders' CRRA coefficient is point-identified from bid data of auctions with at least two different number of active bidders. Our exclusion restriction is consistent with a variety of models with endogenous entry. Empirical application to USFS timber auctions shows that we will conclude that timber firms are risk averse if we ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity. But once we take the unobserved heterogeneity into account, risk neutrality is consistent with the data.
Identification In Ascending Auctions With An Application To Digital Rights Management
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Author : Joachim Freyberger
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Identification In Ascending Auctions With An Application To Digital Rights Management written by Joachim Freyberger and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with Digital rights management categories.
This study provides new identification and estimation results for ascending (traditional English or online) auctions with unobserved auction-level heterogeneity and an unknown number of bidders. When the seller's reserve price and two order statistics of bids are observed, we derive conditions under which the distributions of buyer valuations, unobserved heterogeneity, and number of participants are point identified. We also derive conditions for point identification in cases where reserve prices are binding (in which case bids may be unobserved in some auctions) and present general conditions for partial identification. We propose a nonparametric maximum likelihood approach for estimation and inference. We apply our approach to the online market for used iPhones and analyze the effects of recent regulatory changes banning consumers from circumventing digital rights management technologies used to lock phones to service providers. We find that buyer valuations for unlocked phones dropped after the unlocking ban took effect.
Procurement Auctions With Entry And Uncertain Number Of Actual Bidders
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Author : Xiaoyong Zheng
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Procurement Auctions With Entry And Uncertain Number Of Actual Bidders written by Xiaoyong Zheng and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.