Procurement Bidding In First Price And Second Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions
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Procurement Bidding In First Price And Second Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions
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Author : Anders Lunander
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
Procurement Bidding In First Price And Second Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions written by Anders Lunander and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with categories.
Nonparametric Tests For Common Values At First Price Sealed Bid Auctions
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Author : Philip A. Haile
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Nonparametric Tests For Common Values At First Price Sealed Bid Auctions written by Philip A. Haile and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with Letting of contracts categories.
We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the winner's curse' arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed methods for using observed bids to estimate each bidder's conditional expectation of the value of winning the auction. Equilibrium behavior implies that in a private values auction these expectations are invariant to the number of opponents each bidder faces, while with common values they are decreasing in the number of opponents. This distinction forms the basis of our tests. We consider both exogenous and endogenous variation in the number of bidders. Monte Carlo experiments show that our tests can perform well in samples of moderate sizes. We apply our tests to two different types of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. For unit-price ( scaled') sales often argued to fit a private values model, our tests consistently fail to find evidence of common values. For lumpsum' sales, where a priori arguments for common values appear stronger, our tests yield mixed evidence against the private values hypothesis.
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse
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Author : John H. Kagel
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2009-04-11
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse written by John H. Kagel and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-04-11 with Business & Economics categories.
An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Bidding In First Price Sealed Bid Auctions
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Author : Paulo Fagandini
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Bidding In First Price Sealed Bid Auctions written by Paulo Fagandini and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
Computational methods are used to analyze bidding in first price sealed bid auctions for abroad range of realistic scenarios. Bidders valuations may have both common value and firm-specific components, and the accuracy of their estimates of the common value component may differ. In addition, we allow for a subset of “naive” bidders, defined as bidders who do not account for the Winners' Curse. Following Rothkopf (1969, 1980), Wilson (1984), and Compte and Postlewaite (2012), we obtain a constant Shading Factor that maximizes ex-ante expected profits. Our computations show that profit-maximizing shading is greatly impacted by asymmetries in the bidding population and, in particular, by the presence of naive bidders. Failing to account for the presence of naive bidders results in underbidding only in one case, when facing a single rival who is naive, and in overbidding in all other cases. Overbidding is particularly severe when the population of naive competitors is large.
The First Price Sealed Bid Auction With Asymmetric Bidders
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Author : Patrick L. Bajari
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997
The First Price Sealed Bid Auction With Asymmetric Bidders written by Patrick L. Bajari and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with categories.
Networks Crowds And Markets
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Author : David Easley
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2010-07-19
Networks Crowds And Markets written by David Easley and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-07-19 with Computers categories.
Are all film stars linked to Kevin Bacon? Why do the stock markets rise and fall sharply on the strength of a vague rumour? How does gossip spread so quickly? Are we all related through six degrees of separation? There is a growing awareness of the complex networks that pervade modern society. We see them in the rapid growth of the internet, the ease of global communication, the swift spread of news and information, and in the way epidemics and financial crises develop with startling speed and intensity. This introductory book on the new science of networks takes an interdisciplinary approach, using economics, sociology, computing, information science and applied mathematics to address fundamental questions about the links that connect us, and the ways that our decisions can have consequences for others.
First Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions
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Author : Raymond C. Battalio
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1984
First Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions written by Raymond C. Battalio and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1984 with categories.
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse
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Author : John H. Kagel
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2021-04-13
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse written by John H. Kagel and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021-04-13 with Business & Economics categories.
An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Putting Auction Theory To Work
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Author : Paul Milgrom
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2004-01-12
Putting Auction Theory To Work written by Paul Milgrom and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004-01-12 with Business & Economics categories.
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Best Practices For Online Procurement Auctions
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Author : Parente, Diane H.
language : en
Publisher: IGI Global
Release Date : 2007-12-31
Best Practices For Online Procurement Auctions written by Parente, Diane H. and has been published by IGI Global this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007-12-31 with Education categories.
Offers a systematic approach to the examination of online procurement auctions. Growth in online auctions reinforces the need for understanding the factors important in auctions and the caveats that both researchers and practitioners need to know in order to effectively study and use the auction tool.