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First Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions

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First Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions

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Author : Raymond C. Battalio
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1984

First Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions written by Raymond C. Battalio and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1984 with categories.

Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse

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Author : John H. Kagel
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2002-08-11

Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse written by John H. Kagel and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002-08-11 with Business & Economics categories.

Melding theory with the econometric analysis of filed data, the authors of this text assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. They then gauge the sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisions of sophisticated bidders with students, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments.

Nonparametric Tests For Common Values At First Price Sealed Bid Auctions

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Author : Philip A. Haile
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Nonparametric Tests For Common Values At First Price Sealed Bid Auctions written by Philip A. Haile and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with Letting of contracts categories.

We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the winner's curse' arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed methods for using observed bids to estimate each bidder's conditional expectation of the value of winning the auction. Equilibrium behavior implies that in a private values auction these expectations are invariant to the number of opponents each bidder faces, while with common values they are decreasing in the number of opponents. This distinction forms the basis of our tests. We consider both exogenous and endogenous variation in the number of bidders. Monte Carlo experiments show that our tests can perform well in samples of moderate sizes. We apply our tests to two different types of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. For unit-price ( scaled') sales often argued to fit a private values model, our tests consistently fail to find evidence of common values. For lumpsum' sales, where a priori arguments for common values appear stronger, our tests yield mixed evidence against the private values hypothesis.

Nonparametric Tests For Common Values In Fixed Price Sealed Bid Auctions

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Author : Philip A. Haile
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004

Nonparametric Tests For Common Values In Fixed Price Sealed Bid Auctions written by Philip A. Haile and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.

We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the "winner's curse" arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed methods for using observed bids to estimate each bidder's conditional expectation of the value of winning the auction. Equilibrium behavior implies that in a private values auction these expectations are invariant to the number of opponents each bidder faces, while with common values they are decreasing in the number of opponents. This distinction forms the basis of our tests. We consider both exogenous and endogenous variation in the number of bidders. Monte Carlo experiments show that our tests can perform well in samples of moderate sizes. We apply our tests to two different types of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. For unit-price ("scaled") sales often argued to fit a private values model, our tests consistently fail to find evidence of common values. For "lumpsum" sales, where a priori arguments for common values appear stronger, our tests yield mixed evidence against the private values hypothesis.

Procurement Bidding In First Price And Second Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions

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Author : Anders Lunander
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999

Procurement Bidding In First Price And Second Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions written by Anders Lunander and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with categories.

Asymmetric Information In Common Value Auctions And Contests

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Author : Lucas A. Rentschler
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011

Asymmetric Information In Common Value Auctions And Contests written by Lucas A. Rentschler and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.

In common-value auctions and contests economic agents often have varying levels of information regarding the value of the good to be allocated. Using theoretical and experimental analysis, I examine the effect of such information asymmetry on behavior. Chapter II considers a model in which players compete in two sequential contests. The winner of the first contest (the incumbent) privately observes the value of the prize, which provides private information if the prizes are related. Relative to the case where the prizes are independent, the incumbent is strictly better off, and the other contestants (the challengers) are strictly worse off. This increases the incentive to win the first contest such that the sum of expected effort over both contests increases relative to the case of independent prizes. Chapter III experimentally considers the role of asymmetric information in first-price, sealed-bid, common-value auctions. Bidders who observe a private signal tend to overbid relative to Nash equilibrium predictions. Uninformed bidders, however, tend to underbid relative to the Nash equilibrium. Chapter IV examines asymmetric information in one-shot common-value all-pay auctions and lottery contests from both experimental and theoretical perspectives As predicted by theory, asymmetric information yields information rents for the informed bidder in both all-pay auctions and lottery contests.

Networks Crowds And Markets

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Author : David Easley
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2010-07-19

Networks Crowds And Markets written by David Easley and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-07-19 with Computers categories.

Are all film stars linked to Kevin Bacon? Why do the stock markets rise and fall sharply on the strength of a vague rumour? How does gossip spread so quickly? Are we all related through six degrees of separation? There is a growing awareness of the complex networks that pervade modern society. We see them in the rapid growth of the internet, the ease of global communication, the swift spread of news and information, and in the way epidemics and financial crises develop with startling speed and intensity. This introductory book on the new science of networks takes an interdisciplinary approach, using economics, sociology, computing, information science and applied mathematics to address fundamental questions about the links that connect us, and the ways that our decisions can have consequences for others.

Bidding In First Price Sealed Bid Auctions

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Author : Paulo Fagandini
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019

Bidding In First Price Sealed Bid Auctions written by Paulo Fagandini and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.

Computational methods are used to analyze bidding in first price sealed bid auctions for abroad range of realistic scenarios. Bidders valuations may have both common value and firm-specific components, and the accuracy of their estimates of the common value component may differ. In addition, we allow for a subset of “naive” bidders, defined as bidders who do not account for the Winners' Curse. Following Rothkopf (1969, 1980), Wilson (1984), and Compte and Postlewaite (2012), we obtain a constant Shading Factor that maximizes ex-ante expected profits. Our computations show that profit-maximizing shading is greatly impacted by asymmetries in the bidding population and, in particular, by the presence of naive bidders. Failing to account for the presence of naive bidders results in underbidding only in one case, when facing a single rival who is naive, and in overbidding in all other cases. Overbidding is particularly severe when the population of naive competitors is large.

A Primer On Auction Design Management And Strategy

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Author : David J. Salant
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2014-12-19

A Primer On Auction Design Management And Strategy written by David J. Salant and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-12-19 with Business & Economics categories.

A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.

Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse

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Author : John H. Kagel
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2021-04-13

An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.

First Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions

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