Reasons Justification And Defeat
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Reasons Justification And Defeat
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Author : Jessica Brown
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2021-04-16
Reasons Justification And Defeat written by Jessica Brown and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021-04-16 with Philosophy categories.
Traditionally, the notion of defeat has been central to epistemology, practical reasoning, and ethics. Within epistemology, it is standardly assumed that a subject who knows that p, or justifiably believes that p, can lose this knowledge or justified belief by acquiring a so-called 'defeater', whether that is evidence that not-p, evidence that the process that produced her belief is unreliable, or evidence that she has likely misevaluated her own evidence. Within ethics and practical reasoning, it is widely accepted that a subject may initially have a reason to do something although this reason is later defeated by her acquisition of further information. However, the traditional conception of defeat has recently come under attack. Some have argued that the notion of defeat is problematically motivated; others that defeat is hard to accommodate within externalist or naturalistic accounts of knowledge or justification; and still others that the intuitions that support defeat can be explained in other ways. This volume presents new work re-examining the very notion of defeat, and its place in epistemology and in normativity theory at large.
Reasons Justification And Defeat
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Author : Jessica Brown
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2021
Reasons Justification And Defeat written by Jessica Brown and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with Philosophy categories.
This volume is about the notion of 'defeat' in philosophy. The idea is that someone who has some knowledge, or a justified belief, can lose this knowledge or justified belief if they acquire a 'defeater' - evidence that undermines it. The contributors examine the role of defeat not just in epistemology but in practical reasoning and ethics.
The Nature And Normativity Of Defeat
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Author : Christoph Kelp
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2023-09-04
The Nature And Normativity Of Defeat written by Christoph Kelp and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023-09-04 with Philosophy categories.
Defeat is the loss of justification for believing something in light of new information. This Element mainly aims to work towards developing a novel account of defeat. It distinguishes among three broad views in the epistemology of defeat: scepticism, internalism, and externalism and argues that that sceptical and internalist accounts of defeat are bound to remain unsatisfactory. As a result, any viable account of defeat must be externalist. While there is no shortage of externalist accounts, the Element provides reason to think that extant accounts remain unsatisfactory. The Element also explains the constructive tasks of developing an alternative account of defeat and showing that it improves on the competition.
Oxford Handbook Of Reasons And Normativity
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Author : Daniel Star
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2018-05-31
Oxford Handbook Of Reasons And Normativity written by Daniel Star and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018-05-31 with Philosophy categories.
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides an authoritative guide to it. Few concepts have received as much attention in recent philosophy as the concept of a reason to do or believe something. And one of the most contested ideas in philosophy is normativity, the 'ought' in claims that we ought to do or believe something. This is the first volume to provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, action, and language, the Handbook explores philosophical work on the nature of normativity in general. Topics covered include: the unity of normativity; the fundamentality of reasons; attempts to explain reasons in other terms; the relation of motivational reasons to normative reasons; the internalist constraint; the logic and language of reasons and 'ought'; connections between reasons, intentions, choices, and actions; connections between reasons, reasoning, and rationality; connections between reasons, knowledge, understanding and evidence; reasons encountered in perception and testimony; moral principles, prudence and reasons; agent-relative reasons; epistemic challenges to our access to reasons; normativity in relation to meaning, concepts, and intentionality; instrumental reasons; pragmatic reasons for belief; aesthetic reasons; and reasons for emotions.
The Oxford Handbook Of Reasons And Normativity
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Author : Daniel Star
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2018
The Oxford Handbook Of Reasons And Normativity written by Daniel Star and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with Philosophy categories.
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides an authoritative guide to it. Few concepts have received as much attention in recent philosophy as the concept of a reason to do or believe something. And one of the most contested ideas in philosophy is normativity, the 'ought' in claims that we ought to do or believe something. This is the first volume to provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, action, and language, the Handbook explores philosophical work on the nature of normativity in general. Topics covered include: the unity of normativity; the fundamentality of reasons; attempts to explain reasons in other terms; the relation of motivational reasons to normative reasons; the internalist constraint; the logic and language of reasons and 'ought'; connections between reasons, intentions, choices, and actions; connections between reasons, reasoning, and rationality; connections between reasons, knowledge, understanding and evidence; reasons encountered in perception and testimony; moral principles, prudence and reasons; agent-relative reasons; epistemic challenges to our access to reasons; normativity in relation to meaning, concepts, and intentionality; instrumental reasons; pragmatic reasons for belief; aesthetic reasons; and reasons for emotions.
Epistemic Defeat
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Author : Jan Constantin
language : en
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG
Release Date : 2021-06-21
Epistemic Defeat written by Jan Constantin and has been published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021-06-21 with Philosophy categories.
A number of well-developed theories shed light on the question, under what circumstances our beliefs enjoy epistemic justification. Yet, comparatively little is known about epistemic defeat—when new information causes the loss of epistemic justification. This book proposes and defends a detailed account of epistemic defeaters. The main kinds of defeaters are analyzed in detail and integrated into a general framework that aims to explain how beliefs lose justification. It is argued that defeaters introduce incompatibilities into a noetic system and thereby prompt a structured re-evaluation process that makes a justified reinstatement of the defeated belief impossible. The account is then applied to the topic of disagreement, where it is used in an argument for conciliationism, as well as a new explanation for higher-order defeat. Throughout the book, the notion of defeat is the center of attention, while a number of new issues are discussed at the intersections of defeat and justification. Specifically, new problems are raised for broadly internalist accounts of defeat, a fully descriptive reliabilist account of defeat is provided, and the case for normative defeat is revisited.
New Perspectives On Epistemic Closure
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Author : Matthew Jope
language : en
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Release Date : 2022-09-30
New Perspectives On Epistemic Closure written by Matthew Jope and has been published by Taylor & Francis this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022-09-30 with Philosophy categories.
This volume brings together new research on the topic of epistemic closure from both leading philosophers and emerging voices in epistemology. It connects epistemic closure principles to related themes in epistemology such as scepticism, dogmatism, evidentialism, epistemic logic, and modal epistemology. Epistemic closure is of central importance to contemporary epistemology, so much so that no epistemology is complete without an answer to the question of where it stands on the issue. The chapters in this book touch on the central themes of closure and transmission and argue for and against different closure and transmission principles. The contributors address issues such as whether knowledge and justification are closed under deductive entailment; whether scepticism can be properly contained by restricting closure principles; whether justification for a set of premises can fail to transmit across inference to a conclusion; Moore’s Paradox; and which theories of knowledge—contextualism, contrastivism, or relevant alternatives epistemology—emerge from denying closure. New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology.
Reasons For Belief
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Author : Andrew Reisner
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2011-06-02
Reasons For Belief written by Andrew Reisner and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011-06-02 with Philosophy categories.
Philosophers have long been concerned about what we know and how we know it. Increasingly, however, a related question has gained prominence in philosophical discussion: what should we believe and why? This volume brings together twelve new essays that address different aspects of this question. The essays examine foundational questions about reasons for belief, and use new research on reasons for belief to address traditional epistemological concerns such as knowledge, justification and perceptually acquired beliefs. This book will be of interest to philosophers working on epistemology, theoretical reason, rationality, perception and ethics. It will also be of interest to cognitive scientists and psychologists who wish to gain deeper insight into normative questions about belief and knowledge.
Justification Without Awareness
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Author : Michael Bergmann
language : en
Publisher: Clarendon Press
Release Date : 2006-05-18
Justification Without Awareness written by Michael Bergmann and has been published by Clarendon Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006-05-18 with Philosophy categories.
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other 'good-making' features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it isn't. The first part of Michael Bergmann's book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism, or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author's own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. Bergmann concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism, namely, that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism. Moreover, they do so while placing a high priority on making the author's opponents feel that their positions and objections are understood.
Inquiry
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Author : Aaron B. Creller
language : en
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Release Date : 2025-07-29
Inquiry written by Aaron B. Creller and has been published by Taylor & Francis this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2025-07-29 with Philosophy categories.
This volume brings together essays from several different perspectives on a topic in epistemology that is garnering increased attention: Inquiry. It is the first volume focused solely on philosophical issues related to inquiry. Inquiry is a fundamental human practice. We have questions, and we want answers. These questions span numerous domains and range from the trivial to questions of the utmost importance. Without inquiry, and successful inquiry in particular, our fate is bleak. Inquiry is also familiar. Everyone engages in inquiry. In fact, inquiry (of some sort) is something that we engage in every day. However, while inquiry is both fundamental and familiar, only recently have epistemologists turned to focus explicitly on inquiry. The result is a growing literature concerning questions like the following: Does inquiry have an aim? If so, what is the aim of inquiry? What norms govern inquiry? How are epistemic norms and norms of inquiry related? What does inquiry look like with an epistemic division of labor? Is it ever permissible to interfere with the inquiry of another person? What is the relationship between inquiry and belief? Knowledge? Wisdom? How do bias and prejudice affect inquiry? What is the nature and role of attitudes like curiosity and wonder? Inquiry: Philosophical Perspectives builds on the existing debates surrounding these questions, advancing them, and taking them in new directions. It will appeal primarily to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.